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Right Theory, Wrong Reasons:
Dynamic Interpretation, the Charter
and “Fundamental Laws”
Randal N.M. Graham∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Section 7 of the Charter is one of those rare and wonderful texts that
inspire judges to discuss interpretive theory. This should come as no
surprise. The language of section 7 is so vague and open-textured that it
provides little guidance to those who interpret and apply it. Indeed, the
text of section 7 includes phrases and concepts that are “as enigmatic
and amorphous as any in our jurisprudence”.1 Does section 7’s reference
to “liberty” encompass freedom of contract? What are the boundaries of
“fundamental justice”? What is the meaning of “life”? The nebulous
language of section 7 provides no answers to these questions, yet judges
are compelled to grapple with questions of this nature whenever Charter
litigants rest their claims on section 7’s text.
Because of their vague and amorphous nature, the words of section
7 lack the clarity or precision necessary to constrain the outcomes of
judicial decisions. As a result, judges asked to interpret section 7 are
forced to contend with fundamental questions of adjudicative theory.
Judges applying section 7 must consider how much discretion
interpreters have when interpreting vague constitutional text, and reflect
on the extent to which the lawgiver’s intention can impose constraints
on the meaning given to legislative language. More fundamentally,
judges interpreting section 7 must ask themselves what it truly means to

∗

Associate Professor, University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law. Some of the text of
this essay has been adapted from chapters 1 and 4 of R. Graham, Statutory Interpretation: Theory
and Practice (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2001). I would like to thank my colleagues Jamie
Cameron, Grant Huscroft, Peter Hogg and Jeremy Shaw for their helpful discussions as I prepared
this paper.
1
Mark Carter, “Fundamental Justice in Section 7 of the Charter: A Human Rights
Interpretation” (2003) 52 U.N.B.L.J. 243, at 247.
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“interpret” legislation — is legal interpretation a dynamic, creative
endeavour in which judges are active participants in the generation of
meaning, or is it simply the application of the predetermined
expectations of the democratically accountable author of the statute’s
text? What are the respective powers of interpreter and author? These
questions are particularly important in the context of section 7 of the
Charter: not only is the section so open-ended that the answers to these
questions will govern the section’s application, but — because of the
constitutional force of section 7 — a court’s answers to these questions
carry important implications for fundamental human rights, for the
limits of legislative power and for the division of powers between the
government and the courts. In the context of section 7, the court’s
adoption of a particular theory of interpretation carries far-reaching
implications for the political institutions that shape our nation and our
rights.
The purpose of this essay is to examine the interpretive theory
typically espoused by courts interpreting section 7. That theory, known
as “dynamic” or “progressive” interpretation,2 posits that courts should
play an extremely active role in the development of legislative meaning,
and that a court’s interpretation of legislation (including section 7 of the
Charter) is not constrained by the expectations of the legislative author.
As we shall see, my view is that dynamic interpretation is — in most
cases, at least — the proper method of interpreting the Charter.
Unfortunately, Canadian courts have generally misunderstood the
rationale for invoking dynamic interpretation, and this misunderstanding
carries important implications for the interpretation of legislative texts.
Because of the courts’ misapprehension of the reasons for using
dynamic interpretation, courts may use dynamic interpretation where its
use is inappropriate, or fail to use dynamic interpretation where it is the
optimal method of construing legislation. In the hope of avoiding
problems of this nature, this essay proposes an alternative rationale for
the invocation of dynamic interpretation. Unlike the rationale that has
typically been put forward by our courts, the rationale I proffer in this
essay corresponds to the actual interpretive practices of Canadian jurists.
More importantly, it provides a more principled method of determining
2
In Canada, “Dynamic Interpretation” is typically called progressive or “living tree”
interpretation. My own preference is to use the phrase “dynamic interpretation” (originally coined
by William Eskridge in Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1994)), because of the ambiguous and politically charged nature of the term “progressive”.
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when dynamic interpretation is the appropriate method of resolving
specific interpretive problems.
While section 7 of the Charter could be regarded as Canada’s
“poster child” for dynamic interpretation, the dynamic approach to
interpreting legislation has much broader application. The essay
accordingly begins with an overview of dynamic interpretation and its
application beyond the realm of constitutional law. Following that
overview, the paper describes (in section II) the benefits and weaknesses
of dynamic interpretation. Section III of the paper then turns to the
interpretation of section 7 itself, using section 7 jurisprudence to
demonstrate the courts’ traditional rationale for selecting dynamism as
the “official method” of interpreting constitutional text. The essay goes
on (in section IV) to reject the court’s traditional rationale, and
concludes (in sections V and VI) by proposing an alternative “metatheory” of statutory interpretation — one that provides a principled
method of determining when dynamic interpretation is appropriate, and
when alternative theories of statutory construction are better able to
guide the courts in their interpretation of legislative language.

II. DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION
1. Overview
Dynamic interpretation (or “dynamism”) is the opposite of originalist
construction. Where originalists see the framers’ historic intention as the
only legitimate guide to interpretation, proponents of dynamism hold
that laws should be interpreted by reference to contemporary ideals,
with little or no attention paid to the legislator’s intent. Where the
originalist believes that the lawgiver’s expectations govern the meaning
of all statutory texts, the dynamist holds that a statute’s meaning “is not
tied to the framer’s original understanding but is permitted to evolve in
response to both linguistic and social change”.3
While originalists are frequently portrayed as “statutory archaeologists”
who search for historical evidence of an Act’s intended meaning,4

3

Ruth Sullivan & Elmer Driedger, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes,
4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2002), at 105.
4
See, for example, Pierre-Andre Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 2d
ed. (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 1992), at 7.
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proponents of dynamic interpretation refuse to see a statute’s meaning as an
artifact to be discovered through the use of historical evidence. Instead, the
dynamic interpreter sees the statute’s text as clay that can be shaped in ways
that were not intended by the statute’s drafters. Where the requirements of
logic or justice suggest that a statute should be interpreted in a way that
differs from the intention of the statute’s author, dynamic interpretation
permits the interpreter to select a construction that fits with current needs
and departs from historical expectations. This “dynamic vision” of statutory
construction is encapsulated by Francis Bennion’s nautical analogy:
[T]he ongoing Act resembles a vessel launched on some one-way
voyage from the old world to the new. The vessel is not going to
return; nor are its passengers. Having only what they set out with, they
cope as best they can. On arrival in the present, they deploy their
native endowments under conditions originally unguessed at.5

According to this view of legislation, the meaning of statutory
language must adapt in response to changing social conditions. As time
passes and the text is applied to unforeseen situations, the statute’s
meaning evolves to become something more than what the drafters
intended. Indeed, in many instances, the statute may evolve in ways that
go against the initial intention of the statute’s author.
In Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,6 William Eskridge provides
examples of the manner in which dynamic interpretation can cause a
statute to grow in ways that conflict with the expectations of the
statute’s author. The most striking example Eskridge offers involves the
evolution of section 212(a)(4) of the American Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (the “INA”). Section 212(a)(4) of the INA
required the exclusion of certain “aliens” from the United States of
America. Included in the prohibited list were aliens “afflicted with
psychopathic personality, or sexual deviation, or a mental defect”. At
the time of the section’s enactment in 1952, the purpose behind the
provision was clear: the drafters had stated that their purpose in using
this statutory language was to prevent homosexual immigrants from
entering the U.S. Indeed, Eskridge notes that the phrase “sexual
deviation” had been added to the statute in response to a case that
decided that “psychopathic personality” was insufficiently precise to be
applied to homosexuals. On the advice of the Public Health Service
5
6

Francis Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 2d ed. (London: Butterworths, 1992), at 618.
William Eskridge, supra, note 2, above.
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(“PHS”), the legislative drafters had decided that homosexuality was a
form of “mental disease” or “sexual deviation” that would be caught by
the language used in section 212(a)(4).
An originalist construction of section 212(a)(4) would have referred
to legislative intent and made it clear that homosexuality was a “sexual
deviation” for the purposes of the Act. Notwithstanding this
discriminatory intention, however, by the end of the 1970s even the
PHS (which was responsible for enforcing the INA) had reinterpreted
section 212(a)(4) and announced that the PHS lacked the authority “to
exclude gay men, bisexuals, and lesbians pursuant to section
212(a)(4)”.7 What happened between the date of the statute’s enactment
and the PHS’s “reinterpretation” of section 212(a)(4)? The text of the
relevant statute remained constant, but its meaning changed radically.
According to William Eskridge, this reinterpretation is an instance of
dynamic interpretation. Within a decade of the enactment of section
212(a)(4), American courts began to interpret the section in ways that
made it difficult to apply the statute’s language to homosexuals.8 The
reasoning of the courts that reinterpreted (and improved) section
212(a)(4) is best understood by reference to the changes that took place
in society’s views concerning homosexuality during the 1960s and 70s.
According to Eskridge:
Congress’s .... targeting of “homosexuals” under one of the medical
exclusions rested on the belief, widely held in the 1950s, that
“homosexuals” are mentally ill. This view became more controversial
by the 1960s, as empirical studies found no correlation between
pathology and homosexuality .... Although the view of homosexuality
as a disease was still widely held in the medical community
throughout the 1960s, everything changed — almost immediately —
after the Stonewall riots in 1969, which triggered gay activism against
traditional penalties based on sexual orientation. After Stonewall, it
was much harder to dismiss lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals as
psychotics, for they not only were showing their faces and talking
back, but were working within the medical profession to discredit the
earlier views.9

7

Id., at 54.
For a review of cases that demonstrate the dynamism inherent in this provision, see
Eskridge, id., at 50-57.
9
Id., at 53.
8
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Eskridge goes on to point out that after the Stonewall riots,10
American medical associations removed homosexuality from the list of
mental disorders. The language of the INA, by contrast, remained static
throughout this period. Only through the use of dynamic interpretation
were courts able to disregard the legislature’s original intention and
permit homosexual immigrants to cross America’s borders. As a result
of drastic changes in government policy and shifts in public opinion,
even members of Congress eventually admitted that, despite the fact that
the actual text of the INA had not been changed, the language used in
section 212(a)(4) no longer meant what had initially been intended.11 As
a result, the American courts and Congress used dynamic interpretation
to allow the statute’s language to keep pace with current ideals.
Canadian courts have enthusiastically adopted dynamic interpretation
as the “official method” of interpreting Canada’s constitutional texts.
When interpreting section 7 of the Charter in particular, Canadian jurists
have consistently held that constitutional language is best construed
through the invocation of dynamic interpretation. Before reviewing the
history of dynamic interpretation in the context of the Charter (and in
the context of section 7 in particular), it is important to assess the costs
and benefits associated with a dynamic approach to statutory
construction. Section II, 2. of this essay accordingly provides a brief
discussion of the benefits that are typically associated with dynamic
construction, while section II, 3. describes the criticisms that are most
frequently levelled against it.
2. The Benefits of Dynamic Interpretation
Whether one applies it in the realm of constitutional law or in the
interpretation of “ordinary” enactments, dynamic interpretation can be
quite useful. The principal benefit of dynamic interpretation is its ability
to overcome originalism’s flaws. Where originalism fails to respond to
linguistic evolution, dynamic interpretation thrives on it. Where
originalism fails to recognize the interplay between the interpretation of
a law and its application, dynamic interpretation embraces this interplay

10
The “Stonewall riots” refers to events that took place on June 27, 1969, when
homosexual, bisexual, and transgendered patrons of the Stonewall Bar in New York City staged a
spontaneous uprising against police harassment. The Stonewall riots are often regarded as the birth
of the gay rights movement.
11
135 Congressional Record, ss. 5040-5042, May 9, 1989.
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as the ultimate source of statutory meaning. While originalism relies on
the fictitious and untraceable notion of legislative intent, “dynamic
judges” rely on something that exists: the courts’ assessment of
society’s current needs.12
Dynamism’s “evolutionary” portrayal of statutory interpretation
provides a far more accurate model of judicial interpretation than the
description that is provided by originalists. According to Eskridge, the
originalists are wrong in their contention that the meaning of a statute is
an historical artifact that remains static over time. On the contrary,
statutory meaning constantly changes, even where the text of the statute
remains constant. As Eskridge correctly notes, the evolution of statutory
meaning through the application of law to fact is inevitable. Laws
inexorably bend and stretch in ways in which their authors could not
have predicted. The direction in which the law “bends” is inescapably
influenced by the views of the interpreter, views that will be coloured
more by the current legal context than by any historical beliefs held by
the legislative body that was responsible for the legislation’s enactment.
This inescapable process is described by Sullivan and Driedger as the
means by which “the courts can make the adjustments required for a
comfortable fit between the current needs of subjects and the original
law”.13
Like Eskridge, Côté contends that dynamic interpretation does a
better job than originalism of “dealing with the dynamic relationship
between drafter and interpreter”.14 According to Côté, the drafters of
statutory language do not establish the legislation’s meaning, as
meaning is always “born of interpretation”.15 Over time, as the law is
applied to more and more unforeseen situations, the statute’s meaning
evolves into something beyond that which was envisioned by the
legislative author. Francis Bennion describes the forces behind this
evolutionary process as follows:
Each generation lives under the law it inherits. Constant formal
updating is not practicable, so an Act takes on a life of its own. What
the original framers intended sinks gradually into history. While their

12
13
14
15

This is not to suggest that a court’s assessment of society’s needs will always be correct.
Sullivan & Driedger, supra, note 3, at 107.
Côté, supra, note 4, at 20.
Id.
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language may endure as law, its current subjects are likely to find that
law more and more ill-fitting.16

The dynamic interpreter of language, unlike the originalist, plays an
active role in the development of meaning. While the originalist plays
an essentially passive role in unearthing historical intention, the
dynamic interpreter enters a partnership with the statute’s original
drafters, assisting in the creation of meaning through the application of
abstract language to concrete fact.
Leaving aside any normative implications of the interpreter’s role in
creating a statute’s meaning, one cannot help but acknowledge that this
“dynamic” description of judicial interpretation is far more accurate than
originalism’s depiction of the interpretive process. An interpreter of
language cannot help but be influenced by the context in which an
interpretive problem arises. As Côté notes:
Legal interpretation goes beyond the mere quest for historical truth.
The judge, in particular, does not interpret a statute solely for the
intellectual pleasure of reviving the thoughts that prevailed at the time
the enactment was drafted. He interprets it with an eye to action: the
application of the statute. Legal interpretation is thus often an
“interpretive operation”, that is, one linked to the resolution of
concrete issues. Most authors recognize that the application of statutes
returns to influence their interpretation.17

The facts that surround an interpretive problem will inevitably
colour the judge’s view of the meaning of a legislative passage. Context
is impossible to ignore. For this reason, Côté argues that any form of
interpretation that ignores the significant role of factual context is both
“difficult” and “dangerous”,18 and paints a bleak and inaccurate picture
of the practice of judicial interpretation. Originalism is simply wrong in
its contention that interpretive problems can be resolved by reference to
predetermined meanings: interpretive problems that arise as time goes
by are not resolved by statutory language — on the contrary, the
resolution of these problems typically leads to marginal changes to the
meaning of the statutory text. This evolution of the meaning of
legislation is inevitable. As a result, dynamism’s account of
interpretation is far more accurate than the originalist description.

16
17
18

Francis Bennion, Statute Law (London: Oyez Publishing Ltd., 1980), at 618.
Côté, supra, note 4, at 15.
Id., at 16.
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Beyond its obvious descriptive power, dynamism has demonstrated
the power to promote justice in difficult cases. Because dynamism
explicitly recognizes the “evolutive” nature of language, dynamic
interpretation can permit an archaic law to evolve and respond to
society’s current vision of justice. This is particularly evident in the
realm of human rights, where the public’s views of what qualifies as
“justice” or as a “basic human right” often evolve at a pace that outstrips
the speed with which a legislature can amend its statutes. According to
William Eskridge, dynamic interpretation permits the court to respond
to current views of justice and evolving notions of basic human rights
by using old or out-dated statutes in creative and unexpected ways. As
an example Eskridge points to the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
United Steel Workers v. Weber.19
In Weber, the United States Supreme Court was called upon to
interpret section 703(a)(1) of the American Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which prohibited employment-related discrimination on the grounds of
“race, color, religion, sex or national origin”. The problem before the
Court in Weber involved the legality of private affirmative action
programs. Under a collective agreement entered into by Kaiser Aluminum
and the United Steelworkers, Kaiser Aluminum had established a training
plan designed to eliminate racial imbalances in the workforce. The
collective agreement required 50 per cent of the places in the program to
be reserved for African Americans, who would be selected to fill
positions in the Kaiser Aluminum Plant. One of the side effects of the
program at issue in Weber was the rejection of certain highly qualified
white workers in favour of less experienced black employees. One of the
white labourers who was passed over due to the program was Brian
Weber, who filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) pursuant to section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights
Act. According to Weber, the literal terms of the Civil Rights Act
prohibited affirmative action programs on the grounds that such programs
amounted to employment-related discrimination based on “race” and
“colour”. Indeed, Weber presented substantial evidence to the effect that
the original intention of the drafters of the statute had been to prevent
affirmative action programs from being created. Among the evidence
presented by Weber was an interpretive memorandum submitted to the
Senate by the drafters of the relevant provision. According to this

19

443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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memorandum, section 703(a)(1) would ensure that employers would not
be permitted “to prefer Negroes for future vacancies”.20 In essence, the
memorandum established that the purpose of section 703(a)(1) was to
require “colour-blind” hiring, whereby employment vacancies would be
filled by reference to objective, job-related criteria without reference to
race or colour. Clearly, the original intention of the drafters of section
703(a)(1) was to prohibit the kind of program at issue in Weber. As a
result, the use of originalist construction would have required the Court to
rule in Weber’s favour.
Surprisingly, the Court abandoned its traditional originalist position
and ruled that Kaiser’s affirmative action program was permissible
under the statute. According to Brennan J. for the majority, the program
at issue in Weber, while not in line with the framers’ expectations,
advanced the overall goals and “spirit” of the statute. As a result, despite
the apparent intention of the drafters, who had firmly believed that
affirmative action would be prohibited by the statute, the Court in
Weber decided that a “dynamic” interpretation of the Act did more to
achieve the legislation’s objectives.21
According to William Eskridge, the Court’s decision in Weber
demonstrates the utility of dynamic interpretation. Clearly, one purpose
of the statute at issue in Weber had been to eliminate racial imbalances
in the workforce. Unfortunately, the “colour-blind” approach envisioned
by Congress was unsuccessful: in 1974, 10 years after the statute was
passed, only 1.83 per cent of the workers in Kaiser’s plant were African
American, despite the fact that persons of African descent made up 39
per cent of the area’s workforce. The epidemic of racial inequality that
had given rise to the need for section 703(a)(1) had not been cured
despite the efforts of the legislation’s creators. Eskridge notes that the
problem arose because of objective hiring practices: Kaiser traditionally
hired only experienced craft-workers. Because of their past exclusion
from the workforce, black workers were simply unqualified for the jobs
at Kaiser’s Plant. In order to remedy this problem, Kaiser Aluminum
20

110 Congressional Record 7213, Clark-Case memorandum.
Note that Weber might initially seem like an instance of purposive interpretation (a
specific form of originalism discussed in Graham, supra, note ∗, c. 1). Weber cannot, however,
truly be characterized as an example of originalist construction. The court openly rejected the
construction that was advocated by the drafters of the legislation. The ability to stray from the
legislator’s original understanding while claiming to support the legislator’s purpose reveals a
difficulty of purposive interpretation. Depending on the court’s characterization of the “objective”
of a legislative provision, the court can actually rely on this objective to defeat the true (expressed)
intention of the legislative author.
21
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and the United Steelworkers Union had created the plan at issue in
Weber and thereby improved the racial balance in the workforce. Under
an originalist approach to interpretation, Kaiser’s proactive attack on
discrimination would have failed, and the overall objective of the statute
at issue in Weber (i.e., the promotion of racial balance) would not have
been reached. Only the Court’s surprising adoption of a dynamic
interpretation of the anti-discrimination law permitted the law to achieve
its purpose of promoting equality in the workplace.
Dissenting in Weber, Rehnquist J. invoked an originalist construction
and noted that the drafters of section 703(a)(1) would not have supported
a law that permitted employers to engage in affirmative action. Clearly,
this originalist approach respected the framers’ expectations. What it
failed to do, however, was to advance the important goal of racial
equality: a strictly “colour blind” approach to hiring, while in line with the
drafters’ intentions, would have perpetuated the unjust inequalities that
existed in the workforce. Unskilled black workers would have been
ineligible for higher paying positions because of a lack of experience that
had been caused by generations of discriminatory hiring. Section
703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act, while designed to eliminate employmentrelated discrimination, was simply inadequate for this purpose. Only
through the device of dynamic interpretation could the statute be reshaped in a way that permitted it to achieve its ultimate goal. By allowing
the courts to inject an up-to-date view of social policy into the outdated
(and often inadequate) language of statutory provisions, dynamic
interpretation permits courts to achieve just and fair results22 where
originalist construction is inadequate for this task.
3. Problems with Dynamic Interpretation
Despite the many advantages of dynamic interpretation, proponents of
originalism have found no shortage of flaws in dynamic construction.
The easiest way to demonstrate these flaws is to turn the typical
justifications for originalist construction23 on their head: originalism is

22
Of course, white workers (such as Mr. Weber) who were passed over for employment as
a result of private affirmative-action programs may not see the result in Weber as just and equitable.
The court’s decision to approve such programs clearly required a careful balancing of the interests
of skilled white workers and disadvantaged black applicants (who lacked skill due to historical
discrimination) — a balancing of interests that could not have been attempted had the court been
forced to rely on originalist construction.
23
For a full review of the benefits and weaknesses of originalism, see Graham, supra,
note ∗, c. 1.
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said to promote certainty in the law, whereas dynamism is inherently
unpredictable. While originalism is said to provide an “objective” check
on judicial power, dynamic construction’s highly subjective nature can
give judges an almost unfettered discretion to interpret laws in
surprising and whimsical ways.
One of the most obvious flaws with dynamic interpretation is its
unpredictable nature. The lack of any objective signpost (such as
legislative intent) pointing the way to a statute’s meaning makes it
difficult to foresee the manner in which a provision will be construed.
Even statutes that have already been subjected to judicial interpretation
may be “re-interpreted” in unpredictable ways. The reliability of
precedents is seriously diminished when a future “dynamic interpreter”
may claim that social ideals have changed in a way that supports a new
and creative construction of legislative language. While a statutory
provision may remain unamended for generations, the judicial
interpretation of that provision may go through several changes.
Consider the Court’s decision in Weber (discussed above). In that
case, the Court decided that, despite the intention of the drafters who
were responsible for its enactment, the anti-discrimination provision of
the Civil Rights Act did not prohibit affirmative action programs. In
reliance on the Court’s decision in Weber, employers may have felt free
to create affirmative action programs in order to foster a more
egalitarian workplace. But what would happen if the Civil Rights Act
continued to be subjected to dynamic interpretation? Imagine what
would occur if the political culture of the nation underwent a shift to the
right (a scenario that is easy to imagine given current political trends): if
the courts were to take the view that “modern social ideals” were
incompatible with “reverse discrimination”, employers who had created
affirmative action plans might find themselves subjected to legal
censure. The courts’ continued use of dynamic construction could
sacrifice consistency on the altar of changing ideals, making it
dangerous for the members of the public to order their affairs in reliance
on past judicial decisions. According to dynamism’s critics, such
problems can be avoided by reliance on historical (and therefore static)
legislative intention as the touchstone for judicial interpretation.
The ability of the courts to interpret statutes in unpredictable ways
points to an even greater problem with dynamic interpretation. Through
dynamic construction, the courts take on a legislative role, deciding not
what the legislator meant when enacting a law, but what the legislator
should have said. According to Earl Crawford:
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If the courts were permitted to ignore the expressed intent of the
legislature, they would invade the province of the legislature ... The
legislature would become a nonentity. Legislative power would in fact
be wielded by the judiciary. The courts would actually make the
laws.24

The vision of a judiciary with limitless legislative power does not sit
well with dynamism’s critics. According to Sullivan and Driedger, this
criticism of dynamic construction is rooted in “the idea that in a
democracy certain kinds of decisions should be taken by an elected
legislature rather than the courts”.25 Simply put, a non-elected judiciary
has no right to make decisions that are the province of a politically
accountable legislative body.
The indeterminate nature of dynamic interpretation is the source of
the critics’ fears that dynamic construction will tread on the legislature’s
power. While it may sound theoretically feasible to allow an Act to
evolve in response to changing social conditions, in practice this gives
rise to a host of problems. Who decides when social conditions have
changed to such a degree that the “judicial amendment” of legislation is
required? Who defines the prevailing “social and legal context” that
directs the evolution of legislation? Who should decide the degree to
which a provision must evolve to respond to the requirements of justice
or changing ideals? These decisions fall to the courts, with no fixed,
external frame of reference (such as legislative intent) to act as a means
of reining in judicial power. Courts will be charged with the task of
determining whether or not existing statutes meet the needs of modern
society, and will tailor those statutes in accordance with their own
subjectively determined views of justice. According to proponents of
dynamic interpretation, no check on this form of judicial power is
needed: if the drafters of legislation are unhappy with the court’s
construction of an enactment, the legislature is free to amend the statute.
Unfortunately, this is not always feasible. Eskridge acknowledges that
legislative bodies are largely unaware of judicial interpretation, and only
respond to judicial construction where highly political problems are
involved. Unless an election is on the line, the legislature may lack the
political will to “correct” a creative judicial construction of legislation.

24

Earl Crawford, The Construction of Statutes (St. Louis, MO: Thomas Law Book, 1940),

at 245.
25

Sullivan & Driedger, note 3, supra, at 106.
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Sullivan and Driedger echo this point, noting that “legislatures cannot
engage in continuous monitoring and adaptation of legislation”.26 Where
the judiciary’s view of “social needs” or “modern ideals” is
incompatible with that of the elected branch of the government, the
legislature lacks the ability (or at least the political will) to counter
judicial amendments to legislation.
Owing (in part) to the many weaknesses of dynamic interpretation,
Canadian courts have refrained from endorsing dynamic interpretation
as the courts’ “official theory” for interpreting legislation. Instead, our
courts have adopted originalism as the standard method of interpreting
most laws. Their preference for originalist construction has been
justified numerous times in diverse places. In most instances this
preference has been justified on the basis that only Parliament or the
legislature has the constitutional power to breathe meaning into the text
of legislation. Each statute is an expression of sovereign legislative will,
and it is not the place of the courts to usurp the legislator’s power
through a “creative” form of judicial interpretation. According to Côté:
This doctrine finds its principal foundation in other doctrines, namely
Parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers. The judge,
who is the ultimate interpreter of laws, is not cloaked in the legitimacy
of democratic election. Consequently, he must confine himself to
being, in the words of Montesquieu, “the mouthpiece for the words of
the law”. It is Parliament, or whomever has been delegated legislative
power by Parliament, which bears the responsibility for the political
choices of legislative activity ... These principles postulate the
predetermination of the meaning by Parliament, the passivity of the
interpreter on the political level, and the latter’s submission to the
sovereign will expressed in the enactment.27

Similarly, Dickerson notes that in a constitutional democracy:
... the legislature calls the main policy turns and the courts must
respect its pronouncements. In such a relationship, it would seem clear
that so far as the legislature has expressed itself by statute the courts
should try to determine as accurately as possible what the legislature
intended to be done.28

26

Id., at 107.
Id., at 9.
28
Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes (Boston: Little, Brown,
1975), at 67.
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Out of deference to this separation of powers, Canadian courts have
repeatedly held that originalist construction is the “official theory” of
statutory interpretation in Canada — the theory of choice for the
interpretation of “ordinary” laws.29 Dynamic interpretation has no role in
the interpretation of ordinary enactments, it is argued, because it is not
the court’s place to change the meaning of laws created through the
democratic process.
Despite our courts’ repeated rejection of dynamic interpretation as a
method of interpreting “ordinary” legislation, our courts have (for quite
some time) been perfectly happy to depart from their originalist leanings
and embrace dynamic construction for the purpose of construing the text
of Canada’s Constitution. As a result, the courts’ choice between
originalism (on the one hand) and dynamic interpretation (on the other)
has traditionally depended upon the nature of the statute being
interpreted: where the statute being interpreted is a constitutional
document (such as the Charter or the Constitution Act, 1867) the courts
will use dynamic interpretation.30 Where the statute being interpreted is
an “ordinary” statute, the court will use originalist construction,
interpreting the statute by reference to the historical will of the statute’s
author. The courts’ use of dynamic interpretation in the context of the
Canadian Constitution — and specifically in the context of section 7 of
the Charter — is discussed in the next section of this essay.

III. DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
1. Overview
While Anglo-Canadian jurists sometimes use dynamic construction
when resolving difficult cases, our courts rarely acknowledge the use of
dynamic interpretation in the interpretation of “ordinary” statutes.
Where they have been willing to openly adopt a dynamic approach to
interpretation, however, is where the language of the Canadian
Constitution requires judicial interpretation. In cases involving
constitutional language, the courts abandon their traditional originalist
stance in favour of a more dynamic approach to interpretation. The use
29

See, for example: R. v. Perka, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232; R. v. McIntosh, [1995] S.C.J. No.
16, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686; Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., [1998] S.C.J. No. 2, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27.
30
As we shall see in section IV, 1., below, dynamic interpretation has also been embraced
in the context of the interpretation of human rights enactments.
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of dynamic interpretation when construing the Constitution is
commonly known as the “living tree” approach, and has become the
official method of constitutional interpretation.
The “living tree” method of construing the Constitution was
established by the Privy Council in Edwards v. Canada (Attorney
General).31 In that case, the Privy Council was asked to interpret section
24 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which provides (in part) as follows:
The Governor General shall from Time to Time, in the Queen’s Name,
by Instrument under the Great Seal of Canada, summon qualified
Persons to the Senate; and, subject to the Provisions of this Act, every
Person so summoned shall become a Member of the Senate and a
Senator.

The question in Edwards was whether or not the phrase “qualified
Persons” in section 24 included female persons, permitting women (as
well as men) to occupy places in the Senate.
Despite historical evidence that the framers of section 24 had not
envisioned women in the Senate, the Privy Council in Edwards
determined that the section’s reference to “qualified Persons” should not
be construed in accordance with the framers’ expectations. Instead, the
Constitution’s provisions must be permitted to evolve in response to
changing ideals and shifting social conditions. In Lord Sankey’s
opinion:
The British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capable
of growth and expansion within its natural limits. The object of the
Act was to grant a Constitution to Canada. “Like all written
constitutions it has been subject to development through usage and
convention”: Canadian Constitutional Studies, Sir Robert Borden
(1922). Their Lordships do not conceive it to be the duty of this Board
- it is certainly not their desire - to cut down the provisions of the Act
by a narrow and technical construction, but rather to give it a large and
liberal interpretation. …32

As a result, the “living tree” approach to interpretation was adopted by
the Privy Council as the principal doctrine of constitutional
construction.

31
32

[1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.).
Id., at 136.
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The “living tree” approach to interpreting constitutional language
has been embraced by Canada’s courts. For example, in the Provincial
Electoral Boundaries case,33 the Supreme Court of Canada held that “the
Charter is engrafted onto the living tree that is the Canadian
Constitution”, and that the Canadian Constitution “must be capable of
growth to meet the future”.34 Similarly, the Court in Hunter v. Southam
Inc.35 declared that as a “living tree”, the Constitution of Canada “must
… be capable of growth and development over time to meet new social,
political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers”.36 As a
result of these and numerous other decisions, it would appear that where
the construction of the Constitution’s language is at issue, the Court will
employ a “progressive”, “dynamic” or “living tree” approach to
interpretation.
2. Dynamic Interpretation and Section 7 of the Charter
The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly used discussions of
section 7 as occasions for justifying the dynamic approach to
constitutional construction. This has led to some remarkably “dynamic”
interpretations of section 7 — interpretations which do not merely stray
from the meaning intended by section 7’s original authors, but which
completely override the framers’ intentions. The most famous (or
perhaps “infamous”) example is the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in B.C. Motor Vehicle.37
In B.C. Motor Vehicle, the Court was called upon to interpret the
meaning of “fundamental justice” in section 7. More specifically, the
Court was required to determine whether the principles of fundamental
justice were restricted to procedural matters (such as the right to a fair
hearing) or whether those principles extended to embrace substantive
matters, permitting the courts to invalidate laws on the ground that the
substance of the law was unacceptable. From an originalist perspective,
the meaning of “fundamental justice” in section 7 was clear: the framers

33
Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 46, [1991] 2
S.C.R. 158.
34
Id., at para. 42.
35
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
36
Id., at 155.
37
Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
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of section 7 had intended the phrase to have procedural content only.
According to Assistant Deputy Minister Strayer, one of the legal
officials responsible for drafting section 7:
... it was our belief that the words “fundamental justice” would cover
the same thing as what is called procedural due process, that is the
meaning of due process in relation to requiring fair procedure.
However, it in our view does not cover the concept of what is called
substantive due process, which would impose substantive
requirements as to policy of the law in question.
This has been most clearly demonstrated in the United States in
the area of property, but also in other areas such as the right to life.
The term due process has been given the broader concept of meaning
both the procedure and substance. Natural justice or fundamental
justice in our view does not go beyond the procedural requirements of
fairness ... the term “fundamental justice” appears to us to be
essentially the same thing as natural justice.38

Several framers of section 7 echoed Strayer’s belief that
“fundamental justice” encompassed procedural justice only. Indeed,
Jean Chrétien, then Canada’s Justice Minister, suggested that “natural
justice” (which has a settled procedural meaning) and “fundamental
justice” were essentially interchangeable.
It is not surprising that the framers of section 7 felt that the phrase
“fundamental justice” referred only to procedural due process. The
federal government had already used the phrase “fundamental justice” in
section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights,39 and in that context it had
been given a purely procedural meaning. As Carter notes:
… fundamental justice in the Bill of Rights is little more than another
name for “natural justice”. Natural justice is a well-established concept
that is concerned with the standards of fair procedure, rather than the
substantive fairness of the objective or outcome of the process.40

Indeed, the purely “procedural” meaning which the phrase
“fundamental justice” had been given in the context of the Canadian
Bill of Rights was one of the principal reasons for the reuse of that
phrase in section 7 of the Charter. According to Carter:
38

Id., at para. 36.
S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III.
40
Mark Carter, “Fundamental Justice in Section 7 of the Charter: A Human Rights
Interpretation” (2003) 52 U.N.B.L.J. 243, at 247.
39
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… the principles of fundamental justice replaced a reference to “due
process” in the draft of what is now section 7 of the Charter,
specifically so as to placate concerns that our courts would engage in
substantive review of government activity as had occurred in the
United States.41

The framers of section 7, knowing that the phrase “fundamental
justice” had been interpreted (in the context of the Canadian Bill of
Rights) to have procedural content only, simply transplanted the phrase
into section 7. Quite sensibly, they expected the phrase “fundamental
justice” to mean the same thing in the context of section 7 that courts
had said it meant when it was used within the Bill of Rights. As a result,
it is clear that the authors of section 7 intended “the principles of
fundamental justice” to have procedural content only, and not to allow
the substantive review of the policies underlying legislation.
Despite overwhelming evidence that the drafters of the Charter
intended “fundamental justice” to have procedural content only, the
Court in B.C. Motor Vehicle gave the phrase a broad, substantive
meaning. Speaking for a majority of the Court, Lamer J. (as he then
was) acknowledged the historical evidence noted above but claimed that
this historical understanding of the language used in the Charter was
inappropriate. In adopting a decidedly dynamic interpretation of section
7, Lamer J. claimed that the framers’ understanding of constitutional
text was neither binding upon the court nor particularly convincing.
According to Lamer J. for the majority, the language of section 7
required a forward-looking, progressive interpretation regardless of
what the constitutional drafters had intended. In his view:
If the newly planted “living tree” which is the Charter is to have the
possibility of growth and adjustment over time, care must be taken to
ensure that historical materials, such as the Minutes of Proceedings
and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee, do not stunt its growth.42

By acknowledging the potential for “growth” and “adjustment” in
the Constitution’s provisions, the Court in B.C. Motor Vehicle made it
clear that where the Constitution’s language is being interpreted —
particularly the broad and open-textured language found in section 7 —
a dynamic form of construction is both permitted and required.

41
42

Id., at 247-48.
Supra, note 37, at para. 52.
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The Supreme Court’s commitment to the “dynamic approach” to
interpreting section 7 is further demonstrated by the Court’s decision in
R. v. Morgentaler.43 In that case, the Court was asked to determine
whether the Criminal Code provisions regulating abortion services
contravened section 7 of the Charter. Specifically, the Court was asked
to determine whether Criminal Code restrictions on abortion violated
women’s “security of the person” in a manner that was inconsistent with
the principles of fundamental justice.
An originalist construction of the Charter would surely have led to
the conclusion that section 7 had no bearing on the Criminal Code’s
abortion regulations. In Fidelity to Fundamental Justice: An Originalist
Construction of Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,44 Stephens undertakes an examination of the views held by
the Charter’s authors with respect to section 7 and “the abortion
question”. As an example, Stephens points toward the following
statement made by Jean Chretien’s Parliamentary Secretary in the
House of Commons:
Because this is a matter on which there exist fundamentally different
views in Canada, the Charter does not seek to take a position on …
abortion, believing this is a question better left for the determination
by Parliament in the exercise of its ordinary legislative jurisdiction
which can be adjusted from time to time as social and moral values
evolve. … With respect to the abortion issue, the Charter will not in
any way alter the right of Parliament to legislate concerning abortions
… The will of the people of Canada, as expressed through Parliament,
shall continue to be the arbiter of the abortion issue.45

Jean Chretien himself — then Canada’s Justice Minister — echoed
these sentiments by making the following statement:
I have stated the position of the government in this matter, that the
question of abortion is dealt with in the Criminal Code and in no way
can the Charter be used to interfere with the actions of this Parliament
in relation to the Criminal Code and abortion.46

43

[1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
K. Michael Stephens, “Fidelity to Fundamental Justice: An Originalist Construction of
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2002) 13 N.J.C.L. at 183.
45
House of Commons Debates (March 5, 1981) (cited in Stephens, id., at 235).
46
House of Commons Debates (March 23, 1981), at 8946 (cited in Stephens, note 44,
supra, at 233).
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(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Right Theory, Wrong Reasons

189

This is not to suggest that these views were held by everyone
involved in drafting the Charter. Indeed, several members of the
Progressive Conservative Party (as it then was) feared that, despite the
foregoing assurances (as well as similar assurances provided by the
Justice Department), section 7 of the Charter was sufficiently open-ended
that it might enable a court to interfere with federal laws regarding
abortion. As a result, the PC party proposed an amendment to the Charter,
one explicitly stating that “Nothing in this Charter affects the authority of
Parliament to legislate in respect of abortion.”47 This amendment was
defeated 129-61. The principal reason for its defeat, Stephens argues, was
that a majority of Parliamentarians (including Prime Minister Trudeau
and members of both the NDP and the Liberal Party) took the view that
the amendment was “redundant” — that the amendment added nothing of
substance to the Charter, as section 7 had no bearing on the government’s
authority to regulate abortion as it saw fit.48
Despite fairly convincing evidence that the framers of section 7
believed that the section had no impact on the Criminal Code’s
provisions regarding abortion, the Court in Morgentaler held that the
relevant Code provisions violated section 7. The Court further held that
the Code’s abortion regulations could not be saved by section 1. As a
result, the Code’s abortion regulations were struck down as unjustifiable
violations of section 7. This implies, of course, that the authors of
section 7 had been wrong about its meaning — they had failed to
understand the text they authored. Where the authors of section 7 had
been committed to the notion that the provision had no impact on
abortion regulations, Dickson C.J. claimed that it was “beyond any
doubt” that the Code’s abortion provisions undermined security of the
person,49 and that this interference with protected rights could not be
said to conform to the principles of fundamental justice. As a result, the
Court determined that section 7 of the Charter rendered the Code’s
47
House of Commons Debates (November 27, 1981), at 13436 (cited in Stephens, note 44,
supra, at 235).
48
Of course, there are several ways of looking at Trudeau’s statement that the amendment
would be “redundant”. It could mean (a) that the amendment was unnecessary because s. 7 did not
impact upon Parliament’s authority with respect to abortion, or (b) that s. 33 ensures that
Parliament can continue to legislate as it wishes with respect to abortion, despite any impact s. 7
has. There is some evidence that meaning “b” represents Trudeau’s “actual” intent: see House of
Commons Debates (November 27, 1981), at 13438. A further possibility is that Prime Minister
Trudeau was being disingenuous, or engaging in strategic behaviour designed to secure the passage
of the Charter over the objections of Conservative Party members.
49
Morgentaler, supra, note 43, at para. 23.
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abortion provisions unconstitutional, notwithstanding the fact that
section 7 had been agreed to, in part, as a result of repeated assurances
that Parliament’s laws regarding abortion would not be affected by the
provision. In effect, the Court interpreted section 7 dynamically: they
adopted an interpretation of section 7 which responded to (the Court’s
view of) current needs, current values and a current vision of justice,
paying little or no attention to the intention of the framers.
Recent Charter jurisprudence has confirmed the Court’s
commitment to the dynamic interpretation of section 7. Consider the
decision of the Supreme Court in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney
General).50 In that case, the Court was asked to determine whether or
not certain aspects of Quebec’s welfare scheme violated section 7 of the
Charter. In particular, the question was whether or not the welfare
scheme’s alleged failure to provide adequate social assistance to young
people constituted a deprivation of “life, liberty and security of the
person” within the meaning of that phrase in section 7.
From an interpretive perspective, the most interesting aspect of the
Gosselin decision has little to do with the case’s outcome, or with the
Court’s views regarding the impact of section 7 of the Charter on
Quebec’s welfare system. Instead, the importance of Gosselin lies in the
Court’s demonstration of the depths of its commitment to dynamic
interpretation. Indeed, certain statements by the majority in Gosselin
show that the Court’s commitment to dynamic construction, and to its
vision of section 7 as a “fluid” or “evolutive” provision, is so deep that
even decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada cannot halt the
evolution of section 7.
Writing for the majority in Gosselin, McLachlin C.J. said very little
regarding the framers’ intention with respect to the meaning of section
7’s language. Instead, she focused on the meaning section 7 had been
given in prior decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. Specifically,
the Chief Justice noted that the lion’s share of past Supreme Court
readings of section 7 had suggested that the section applied only to state
actions taken in an adjudicative context — a context that was notably
absent on the facts of Gosselin. Because the Gosselin case related to the
administration of a welfare system, and not to an individual’s treatment
during adjudicative proceedings, earlier cases regarding the meaning of
section 7 made it appear that section 7 had no bearing on Gosselin’s

50
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complaint. Somewhat surprisingly, the Chief Justice (for the majority)
went on to hold that these earlier readings of section 7 were no bar to
the application of section 7 beyond the adjudicative realm. Indeed,
McLachlin C.J. made it clear that, pursuant to the Court’s dynamic
approach to interpreting section 7, past judicial interpretations of the
section can be modified, ignored or even explicitly abandoned where the
Court takes the view that a new interpretation is better. According to
McLachlin C.J. (for the majority):
… the dominant strand of jurisprudence on s. 7 sees its purpose as
guarding against certain kinds of deprivation of life, liberty and
security of the person, namely those “that occur as a result of an
individual’s interaction with the justice system and its administration”
... This view limits the potential scope of “life, liberty and security of
person” by asking whom or what s. 7 protects against. Under this
narrow interpretation, s. 7 does not protect against all measures that
might in some way impinge on life, liberty or security, but only
against those that can be attributed to state action implicating the
administration of justice. … With respect, I believe this conclusion
may be premature ... An adjudicative context might be sufficient, but
we have not yet determined that one is necessary in order for s. 7 to be
implicated.
In my view, it is both unnecessary and undesirable to attempt to
state an exhaustive definition of the administration of justice at this
stage, delimiting all circumstances in which the administration of
justice might conceivably be implicated. The meaning of the
administration of justice, and more broadly the meaning of s. 7, should
be allowed to develop incrementally, as heretofore unforeseen issues
arise for consideration.51

Note the italicized language in this passage. The meaning of section
7 is a matter of judicial determination — not a question of intention or
authorial expectations. In the future, section 7 might apply beyond the
adjudicative context, because “we” (the judges) “have not yet
determined that [an adjudicative context] is necessary”. This passage
makes two points. First, it reminds us that the framers’ intention has
little bearing on section 7’s meaning. Second, it points out that the
Court’s earlier interpretations of section 7 — interpretations which
suggested that the section applied only where adjudicative proceedings

51

Id., at paras. 77-79 (emphasis added).
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threatened to result in the deprivation of a person’s life, liberty or
security of the person — did not preclude a holding that section 7 had
recently evolved such that it now applied beyond the bounds of
adjudicative contexts.
Continuing her review of earlier Supreme Court interpretations of
section 7, the Chief Justice noted that earlier courts had been unwilling
to construe section 7 in a way that imposed upon the state an affirmative
duty to safeguard life, liberty or security of the person. Instead, the
Court’s earlier jurisprudence had suggested that section 7 imposed no
“positive obligations” of any kind: the section merely prohibited certain
state deprivations of life, liberty and security of the person, imposing no
affirmative duty to promote those rights. According to the majority in
Gosselin, these earlier Supreme Court interpretations of section 7 could
not preclude a future court from holding that section 7 had continued to
evolve, resulting in a “new meaning” that contradicted earlier holdings
of the Supreme Court of Canada. According to the Chief Justice:
Nothing in the jurisprudence thus far suggests that s. 7 places a
positive obligation on the state to ensure that each person enjoys life,
liberty or security of the person. Rather, s. 7 has been interpreted as
restricting the state’s ability to deprive people of these. Such a
deprivation does not exist in the case at bar.
One day s. 7 may be interpreted to include positive obligations.
To evoke Lord Sankey’s celebrated phrase in Edwards v. AttorneyGeneral for Canada … the Canadian Charter must be viewed as a
“living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits”
… It would be a mistake to regard s. 7 as frozen, or its content as
having been exhaustively defined in previous cases.52

The impact of these statements should be clear. In the context of
section 7 of the Charter, the Court’s commitment to dynamic
construction is so deep that neither authorial intention nor prior judicial
interpretations of the section serve as reliable indicators of the section’s
current meaning. So long as the Court is willing to hold that the current
needs of Canadians are now different than they were when previous
cases were decided, or when the framers first adopted section 7, the
Court is free to hold that section 7’s meaning has changed, perhaps
embracing concepts that were rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada
in the past. The Court’s commitment to dynamic interpretation is so
52
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great that neither precedent, authorial intention nor basic notions of
certainty and predictability serve to bar the evolution of the meaning of
section 7.
The foregoing cases demonstrate that our highest Court views
dynamic interpretation as the appropriate method of resolving any
interpretive problem arising in the context of section 7 of the Charter.
Indeed, section 7 jurisprudence has confirmed that dynamic
interpretation is the court’s “official” method of interpreting all
provisions of the Canadian Constitution. The traditional justifications
offered for the court’s adoption of dynamic interpretation in the
constitutional context are discussed in the following section of this
essay.

IV. JUDICIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION
1. The Amendment Rationale
Why has our Supreme Court so wholeheartedly embraced dynamic
construction in the context of the interpretation of Canada’s
Constitution? Peter Hogg correctly notes that the language of
constitutional documents is particularly well-suited for dynamic (or
“progressive”) interpretation. As Hogg points out:
The idea underlying the doctrine of progressive interpretation is that
the Constitution Act, 1867, although undeniably a statute, is not a
statute like any other: it is a “constituent” or “organic” statute, which
has to provide the basis for the entire government of a nation over a
long period of time. An inflexible interpretation, rooted in the past,
would only serve to withhold necessary powers from the Parliament or
Legislatures. It must be remembered too that the Constitution Act,
1867, like other federal constitutions, differs from an ordinary statute
in that it cannot easily be amended when it becomes out of date, so
that its adaptation to changing conditions must fall to a large extent
upon the courts.53

Clearly, the need for “dynamic” or “progressive” interpretation is
particularly pressing when constitutional language is being considered.
As Professor Hogg points out, constitutional language must apply over
an unusually long period, due in part to the difficulty involved in
53

Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997), at 421.
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amending the Constitution’s text. As social values change over time, a
“static” constitution might no longer meet the needs of the society that it
governs. Cumbersome amendment procedures might preclude the
formal updating of the constitutional text to meet the current needs of
society. As a result, the courts carry out the difficult work of “adapting”
the constitution through dynamic interpretation, ensuring that the text
remains relevant as society evolves.
While it is intuitively appealing to link the adoption of dynamic
interpretation to the difficulty involved in amending constitutional text,
this linkage (which I refer to as the “Amendment Rationale”) does not
fully explain our courts’ interpretive practice. Let us suppose, for a
moment, that the cumbersome nature of the Constitution’s formal
amending procedure is the principal justification for dynamic
interpretation. If that is the case, then we should encounter “dynamic
readings” of the Constitution only where two conditions are met,
namely (1) the needs of Canadians have evolved in ways that could not
have been anticipated by the Constitution’s framers, and (2) in the
absence of dynamic interpretation, a formal amendment to the
Constitution would be needed to cope with these unforeseen
developments. It seems to me that this degree of evolution would take
time: we should expect to see “dynamic readings” of constitutional
language only where a significant period of time had passed between the
adoption of the Constitution and its application to a particular set of
facts. More importantly, if the “Amendment Rationale” is correct, we
should see dynamic construction only where we can credibly assert that
the framers of the Constitution could not have foreseen the issue that has
given rise to the need for constitutional interpretation.
Consider the dynamic readings of section 7 discussed in the
previous section of this paper. The decision of the Court in BC Motor
Vehicle, which overrode the framers’ intended meaning of the phrase
“fundamental justice”, was handed down only three years after the
adoption of the Charter. Had Canadian society evolved so much in the
period between the adoption of the Charter and the Court’s decision in
BC Motor Vehicle that the former needed only “procedural due process”
while the latter required the court to engage in substantive review of
legislative policies? I doubt it. More importantly, the notion of
“substantive due process”, which was grafted onto the Charter by the
Court in BC Motor Vehicle, was not a newly evolved concept that the
framers had failed to anticipate: they had discussed it and specifically
rejected it. As a result, the dynamic reading in BC Motor Vehicle did not
flow from an unanticipated development that, in the absence of dynamic
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interpretation, would have necessitated a formal constitutional
amendment. The decision in Morgentaler is similarly difficult to justify
by reference to the Amendment Rationale: that decision was handed
down only six years after the Charter was adopted. Had Canadian
society evolved so much in the intervening period that, failing a formal
amendment of the Constitution’s text, a “judicial amendment” of section
7 was necessary to permit the Charter to keep pace with newly evolved
social values — values that had not been anticipated when the Charter
was adopted? Had public debates regarding abortion markedly changed
focus between 1982 and 1988, such that the framers’ expectations
regarding the Charter and its application to abortion laws no longer met
the needs of our evolving society? The answer to these questions must
be “no”. Indeed six years after Morgentaler was decided, L’HeureuxDubé J. noted that the Charter was still “in its infancy”, and that
Canada’s “socio-economic context” had not had time to evolve since the
time of the Charter’s adoption.54 For L’Heureux-Dubé J. (who was
dissenting on this point), this implied that dynamic interpretation was an
inappropriate method of interpreting the Charter. Whether or not one
agrees with L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s conclusion, one must accept that,
because so little time had passed between the adoption of the Charter
and the decisions in Morgentaler and BC Motor Vehicle, the dynamic
readings of section 7 in those cases could not truly have been justified
on the ground that the Constitution’s formal amendment procedures had
prevented the Charter’s text from keeping pace with the needs of a
radically changed society. As a result, the Court’s willingness to
construe the Charter dynamically must be rooted in something other
than the “Amendment Rationale”.
There is a second, more compelling reason for rejecting the
“Amendment Rationale” as the true reason behind the Court’s adoption of
dynamic construction. Simply put, the Amendment Rationale does not
accurately explain the courts’ interpretive practice. This can be seen when
one examines the courts’ method of interpreting “ordinary” (that is, nonconstitutional) statutes guaranteeing human rights — legislation containing
language which, in many important respects, parallels the language found
in section 7. In countless cases involving the application of human rights
enactments, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that such statutes must
be construed through the invocation of dynamic interpretation: the
decisions of the Court in Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v.
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Simpsons-Sears Ltd.55 and British Columbia (Public Service Employee
Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government and Service
Employees Union56 serve as useful illustrations. While the details of these
cases are beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that in each case
the Court applied dynamic construction to a Human Rights enactment
notwithstanding the fact that Human Rights enactments can be amended
through ordinary legislative amending procedures.57
Why did the Courts in Sears and BCGSEU feel free to invoke
dynamic construction as the appropriate method of interpreting human
rights enactments? As we have seen, dynamic construction is typically
associated with the interpretation of constitutional text, and the
justification typically offered is that constitutions are difficult to amend.
Human rights statutes, by contrast, can be amended just as easily as the
Highway Traffic Act. As a result, the “Amendment Rationale” cannot
explain the Court’s preference for dynamic interpretation. The
willingness of the Court to use dynamic interpretation must relate to
something other than the “Amendment Rationale”. The alternative
justification that has been offered by our courts is discussed in the
following section of this paper.
2. The “Fundamental Law” Rationale
Canadian courts seem to have noticed that the “Amendment Rationale”
does a rather dismal job of explaining the cases in which the courts have
invoked dynamic interpretation. Because the Amendment Rationale fails
to correspond to our courts’ interpretive practices, Canadian jurists have
had to articulate a new and different justification for the adoption of
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[1985] S.C.J. No. 74, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536.
[1999] S.C.J. No. 46, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3.
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Both Sears and BCGSEU involved the meaning of the word “discriminate” in the
context of Human Rights legislation. In Sears, the Court created a complicated distinction between
“adverse effect” discrimination and direct discrimination, and designed distinct remedial options for
each form of discrimination. In BCGSEU (decided 14 years after the “bifurcated analysis” of Sears
had been created) the Court determined that the distinction between “adverse effect” and “direct”
discrimination was no longer useful, and accordingly obliterated the distinction between these
forms of discrimination. These fundamental changes in the meaning of “discriminate” took place
notwithstanding the fact that the relevant statutory language had not been amended (in any material
way) during the relevant period. As a result, they are explainable only as instances of dynamic
interpretation. For a thorough account of these cases and the interpretive theories espoused by the
relevant courts, see R. Graham, Fair, Large, Liberal, Broad and Generous: The Interpretation of
Human Rights Legislation, published in the proceedings of the National Judicial Institute’s Seminar
Series for Federal Court Judges, September 11, 2003.
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dynamic interpretation. This alternative justification is that
constitutional text, as well as the text of human rights legislation,
qualifies as “fundamental legislation”. As “fundamental legislation”,
both the Constitution and human rights enactments call for the
application of a special form of judicial interpretation. Specifically, such
fundamental laws must be interpreted through the invocation of
dynamic construction.
Why has the judiciary apparently selected dynamic construction as
the appropriate mode of interpreting “fundamental” legislation? No
clear reasons have been offered. Instead, when attempting to justify the
invocation of dynamic construction in the context of constitutional text
or human rights enactments, the courts have simply asserted that the
importance of those documents justifies a departure from the courts’
typical (originalist) approach to interpretation. As Lamer J. explained in
Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. Heerspink:58
When the subject matter of a law is said to be the comprehensive
statement of the “human rights” of the people living in that
jurisdiction, then there is no doubt in my mind that the people of that
jurisdiction have through their legislature clearly indicated that they
consider that law, and the values it endeavours to buttress and protect,
are … more important than all others … Indeed [such a law] is not to
be treated as another ordinary law of general application. It should be
recognized for what it is, a fundamental law.59

In the context of interpreting section 7 of the Charter, the Court in
Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission)60 made
similar statements to justify the use of dynamic construction. According
to LeBel J. in Blencoe:
We must remember … that s. 7 expresses some of the basic values
of the Charter … its importance is such for the definition of
substantive and procedural guarantees in Canadian law that it would
be dangerous to freeze the development of this part of the law. The full
impact of s. 7 will remain difficult to foresee and assess for a long

58
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[1982] 2 S.C.R. 145.
Id., at 157-58.
[2000] S.C.J. No. 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307.
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while yet. Our Court should be alive to the need to safeguard a degree
of flexibility in the interpretation and evolution of s. 7 of the Charter.61

Once again, the “importance” (or fundamental nature) of the law
being interpreted was the primary justification for the court’s decision to
use dynamic construction. Once again, the linkage between
“fundamental laws” and dynamic interpretation was not explained: it
was simply taken for granted that a fundamental law must be subjected
to dynamic interpretation.
Despite the fact that the linkage between “fundamental laws” and
dynamic interpretation has never been satisfactorily explained, it has
become an accepted element of interpretive jurisprudence. As a result,
where “fundamental” laws are being interpreted, the court invokes
dynamic interpretation. Where “ordinary” laws are being interpreted, by
contrast, the court purports to rely on originalist construction, also
known as the “official theory” of statutory construction.62 The reason for
this bifurcated approach to interpretation remains, generally speaking, a
mystery.
With respect, the courts have been wise to invoke dynamic
interpretation in many cases. Unfortunately, the rationale given for the
selection of dynamic interpretation in such cases is unsatisfactory: the
fact that constitutions and human rights enactments count as
“fundamental laws” or “more important” than other statutes provides no
basis for interpreting such laws through the invocation of dynamic
interpretation. Specific critiques of the “fundamental law” rationale are
developed in the following section of this essay.
3. Problems with the Fundamental Law Rationale
I have never been an enthusiastic admirer of the linkage between
“fundamental laws” and the invocation of dynamic construction. To
begin with, the view that dynamic interpretation is required wherever
“fundamental laws” are being construed suggests that certain laws are
too important to be maintained and updated through an ordinary
democratic process. Where courts declare that a particular statute counts
as “fundamental”, the courts claim a primary role in the creation of its

61
Id., at para. 188. This passage was adopted by the majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Gosselin v. Quebec, [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at para. 82.
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See Côté, supra, note 4, at 4.
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meaning. In other words, where a particular law is deemed to be
particularly important, the judiciary claims the authority to control the
Act’s development — they may engage in acts of judicial amendment,
causing the meaning of the enactment to evolve without regard for the
intention of the author, or in ways that override the legislator’s
expectations. Where laws are more mundane, less important, or lessthan-fundamental, by contrast, the courts are content to leave the
statute’s meaning in the hands of the statute’s author. This approach
seems rather crass: while the legislature is competent to control the
meaning and growth of “ordinary” legislation, the truly important laws
require the supervision of judges. Indeed, Supreme Court judges have
suggested that it would be “dangerous” or “a mistake” to leave the
meaning of fundamental laws in the hands of those who wrote and
passed them.63 For reasons I hope are obvious, I am uncomfortable with
the suggestion that some laws are too important to be left in the hands of
those who proposed, developed and passed the laws in the first place.
Leaving aside the political implications of the courts’ suggestion
that certain laws are so important that the government cannot govern the
laws’ meaning, it is important to consider the practical impact of the
“fundamental law” justification for the invocation of dynamic
construction. If the courts’ choice of interpretive theory is governed by
the question of whether or not a particular law is “fundamental”, how
can we tell what qualifies as a “fundamental law”? Are constitutional
provisions and human rights enactments the only fundamental laws in
the statute books? Clearly, Canada’s constitutional documents are
“fundamental” in nature: they are, after all, the laws that grant our
lawgivers the authority to enact other forms of legislation. But why are
human rights laws “fundamental”? Are they the only non-constitutional
laws that count as “fundamental”? While human rights enactments are
undeniably important, are they any more “fundamental” than the
Criminal Code’s prohibition of murder? Are they more fundamental in
nature than laws prohibiting child abuse? Laws establishing federal
courts? Laws allowing individuals to safeguard their own property?
Surely, many of Canada’s laws reflect the fundamental values upon
which Canadian society has been built. Is there something especially
“fundamental” about human rights enactments, making statutes of this
nature more important than all others? When Lamer J. (as he then was)
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made the original pronouncement that human rights enactments were
more important than other statutes, he relied upon no logical
justification for this suggestion apart from the fact that there was “no
doubt in [his] mind”.64 Unfortunately, Lamer J. gave no reasons for his
confidence in the unequalled importance of human rights enactments.
As a result, the “fundamental law” rationale provides no guidance as to
what (apart from human rights enactments and constitutions) might
count as fundamental laws, or why such statutes are considered
fundamental. If the question of whether or not a particular law is
“fundamental” governs the way in which the courts interpret the
relevant legislation, it would be useful to have some general notion of
what it takes to qualify as a “fundamental” statute. Indeed, some general
description of what makes a law count as “fundamental” could allow
Parliament to know, in advance, which of its statutes would be reshaped
through dynamic interpretation.
Given that, in the context of the interpretation of human rights
enactments, the “fundamental law” rationale is often accompanied by
references to the “quasi-constitutional” stature of such documents, one
might argue that the fundamental nature of such statutes flows from
parallels that exist between human rights enactments and the
constitution. The most obvious of these parallels relates to the notion of
paramountcy: as Lamer J. observed in Insurance Corp. of British
Columbia v. Heerspink,65 much like Canada’s Constitution, human
rights enactments are intended to “supersede all other laws when
conflict arises”.66 As a result, a “fundamental” enactment might be one
which has the ability to overrule other statutes in the event of
disagreement between two legislative provisions.
While it would be convenient to rely on the notion of paramountcy
as an explanation for the courts’ suggestion that human rights
enactments are “quasi-constitutional” or “fundamental” in nature, this
suggestion is countered by the jurisprudence. In Robert c. Québec
(Conseil de la magistrature),67 for example, the Quebec Court of Appeal
referred to the Access Act of Quebec68 as “quasi-constitutional”
legislation. The Court’s assessment of the Access Act was not based on
64
65
66
67
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Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 157.
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Id., at 158.
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any suggestion that the Act could triumph over other statutes in the
event of inconsistency: indeed, there is no basis for contending that
the Access Act should ever triumph over other statutes. On the contrary,
the Court’s suggestion that the Access Act was “quasi-constitutional”
was rooted entirely in the notion that access to information (which is
regulated by the Access Act) is “one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system”.69 Like Lamer J.’s assessment of the importance of
Canada’s human rights enactments, this amounts to nothing more than a
value judgment regarding the relative importance of the subject matter
of the relevant statute. The Supreme Court of Canada has made similar
value judgments concerning other legislation.70 As a result of these
cases, it appears that the decision of whether or not a particular law is
“fundamental” (and accordingly deserving of dynamic interpretation)
involves nothing more than the highly subjective determination of a
law’s importance relative to other legislation. The decision to declare a
law to be “fundamental”, “quasi-constitutional” or “more important”
than other statutes is a matter of unbridled judicial discretion, providing
no useful guidance as to why laws of this nature call for the invocation
of dynamic construction.
Perhaps the most important criticism of the “fundamental law”
rationale for the use of dynamic interpretation is that this rationale does
not explain the actual interpretive practices of the courts. In many cases
involving laws which are neither “quasi-constitutional” nor apparently
“more important” than other statutes, the Supreme Court of Canada has
(without admitting it openly) invoked dynamic construction without
reliance on the rationale proffered in cases involving constitutions and
human rights enactments. Such cases demonstrate that the Court’s
invocation of dynamic interpretation is not, in fact, inextricably
intertwined with the “fundamental” or “quasi-constitutional” status of a
particular Act. The Court’s decision in R. v. Butler71 provides a useful
example.
In Butler, the Supreme Court of Canada applied dynamic
interpretation to a statute that was neither part of the Constitution nor
“quasi-constitutional” in nature. The provision at issue in Butler was
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Robert, supra, note 67, at para. 47.
See also Lavigne v. Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages), [2002]
S.C.J. No. 55, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 773, in which the Supreme Court of Canada referred to the Official
Languages Act as a quasi-constitutional enactment.
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section 163 of the Criminal Code — a provision that prohibited the sale
of obscene materials. The charges against Mr. Butler stemmed from
Butler’s sale of explicit, “hard core” videos from an adult video store
located in Winnipeg, Manitoba. At the time that the charges were laid
against Mr. Butler, section 163 of the Code provided as follows:
163(1) Everyone commits an offence who,
(a) makes, prints, publishes, distributes, circulates, or has in his
possession for the purpose of publication, distribution or
circulation any obscene written matter, picture, model,
phonograph record or other thing whatever …

The following partial definition of “obscene” was provided by
subsection 163(8):
(8) For the purposes of this Act, any publication a dominant
characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and
any one or more of the following subjects, namely, crime, horror,
cruelty and violence, shall be deemed to be obscene.

No further definition of “obscene” was provided by the Code.
The principal issue before the Court in Butler involved the
constitutionality of section 163. For present purposes, however, the most
important aspect of the Court’s decision was the manner in which the
Court defined “obscene” for the purpose of section 163. Based on a
strictly originalist construction, one would expect the term “obscene” to
be given the meaning it would have held when the predecessor of
section 163 was first enacted in 1892, or perhaps when the statute was
substantially redrafted in 1959. In accordance with the tenets of
originalism, the meaning of “obscene” should have been determined in
accordance with the intention of the provision’s historical drafters:
drafters who surely expected the section to uphold a standard of
morality that would be considered “prudish” by current Canadian
standards. Had the Court in fact adopted this originalist (or static)
definition, matters that would have been embraced by section 163 at the
time that it was drafted would still be illegal today. Such a definition
would clearly have criminalized a broad range of behaviour that would
otherwise be considered acceptable under current moral standards.
The Court in Butler departed from its traditional, static method of
interpreting ordinary legislation and adopted a dynamic interpretation of
section 163. Writing for the majority, Sopinka J. adopted a dynamic
definition of “obscene” that relied on current standards of morality,
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permitting the term to evolve along with shifting public values. Rather
than criminalizing all forms of expression that would have been viewed
as obscene by Parliamentarians at the time of the section’s creation,
section 163 was allowed to be “redefined” from time to time by the
judiciary in order to keep pace with community standards. In adopting
this dynamic “community standards” test, Sopinka J. relied on the
following passage from the decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in
R. v. Dominion News & Gifts (1962) Ltd.:72
Community standards must be contemporary. Times change, and ideas
change with them. Compared to the Victorian era this is a liberal age
in which we live. One manifestation of it is the relative freedom with
which the whole question of sex is discussed. In books, magazines,
movies, television, and sometimes even in parlour conversation,
various aspects of sex are made the subject of comment, with a
candour that in an earlier day would have been regarded as indecent
and intolerable. We cannot and should not ignore these present-day
attitudes when we face the question whether [the subject materials] are
obscene according to our criminal law.73

The Court accordingly held that the term “obscene” was essentially
dynamic, able to change and evolve in accordance with modern
community standards. Material that may have been viewed as obscene
by the statute’s drafters might accordingly escape the legislation’s
application, depending upon the way in which the material in question
was viewed under modern notions of morality.
As noted above, the legislation at issue in Butler was neither part of
the Constitution nor a “quasi-constitutional” enactment, yet courts have
consistently stated that the progressive or dynamic mode of construction
used in Butler should be limited to these “fundamental” forms of
legislation. The Criminal Code of Canada, while undeniably important,
is not a “fundamental law” in the sense that it establishes basic rights,
sows the seeds of responsible government or trumps other legislation in
the event of inconsistencies. Indeed, Criminal Code provisions have
been given clearly originalist constructions on many occasions. It is also
important to note that the statute under consideration in Butler was no
more difficult to amend than any other “normal” statute — any session
of Parliament could have provided a new statutory definition of
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[1963] 2 C.C.C. 103 (Man. C.A.), revd [1964] S.C.R. 251.
Id., at 116-17 (C.A.).
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“obscene” that kept pace with current morals or contemporary needs.
Why, then, did the Court in Butler choose to adopt an interpretation that
is ordinarily restricted to constitutional provisions (or at least quasiconstitutional statutes)? In my view, the answer lies in the nature of the
language that was being considered in Butler. Indeed, I believe that the
Court’s decision to rely on dynamic or originalist construction is
inevitably governed by the nature of the linguistic problem giving rise to
the need of interpretation, and — despite judicial dicta to the contrary
— has little or no relationship to the relative importance of the statute
being considered. The nature of the linguistic problems governing
courts’ interpretive choices, and the implications of these linguistic
problems for the courts’ selection of an appropriate form of
interpretation, are discussed in the following sections of this essay.

V. LINGUISTIC STRUCTURES
1. Unified Theory
As we have seen throughout this essay, the courts’ description of their
approach to interpretive theory has been based on a division between
“fundamental laws”, which are interpreted by reference to dynamic
interpretation, and “ordinary laws”, which should be interpreted by
reference to originalist construction. As constitutions and human rights
enactments are considered “fundamental”, they are traditionally
interpreted in a highly dynamic fashion.
As we saw in section IV, 3., above, there are problems with the
“fundamental law” rationale for the invocation of dynamic
interpretation. First, it is difficult to predict what qualifies as a
“fundamental” or “quasi-constitutional” law. More importantly, the
question of whether or not a particular law is “fundamental” is not an
accurate predictor of the court’s interpretive practice: in cases such as
Butler, the Court has shown willingness to interpret “ordinary
enactments” in the manner that the Court has said is reserved for
fundamental legislation. In sum, the Court’s proposed division of
interpretive theory (that is, reserving dynamic interpretation for
“fundamental” statutes, and using originalism for all others) is (a) based
on an unclear (and rather flimsy) rationale that provides little or no
practical guidance to courts faced with a choice between competing
interpretive theories, and (b) an inaccurate description of the Court’s
interpretive practice. This is not to say that the Court has been wrong to
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invoke dynamic interpretation in some cases and originalism in others.
On the contrary, it simply suggests that a new approach to “theory
selection” is required. The Court is in need of a principled basis for
determining whether to invoke originalism or dynamism in cases
involving the interpretation of statutory texts.
Elsewhere I have shown that the judiciary’s choice of interpretive
theory should not be based on the type of document being considered
(that is, constitutional, quasi-constitutional, fundamental or “ordinary”),
but on the type of language giving rise to the need for interpretation.74
Indeed, there are undeniable structures found in legislative language
pointing the way toward the interpretive theory that best resolves
specific interpretive problems. For present purposes, it is enough to
focus on two specific aspects of legislative language that may guide the
courts’ decision regarding the proper method of construing unclear
legislation, regardless of the nature of the document being considered.
These two linguistic structures are known as “ambiguity” and
“vagueness”, and are discussed at length below.
2. Ambiguity
The need for judicial interpretation often arises because of statutory
provisions that are ambiguous. A statute may be referred to as
“ambiguous” where it supports two or more constructions that are
different and specific. For example, the phrase “Universities must have
dormitories for male and female students” is ambiguous because it has
two specific and different meanings: on the one hand, the phrase could
mean that universities must have co-ed accommodations (Interpretation
“A”). On the other hand, the phrase could mean that universities must
have some dormitories for male students only and some separate
dormitories for female students (Interpretation “B”). The author of this
statement meant either A or B, but the statement is ambiguous in that a
reasonable audience could come away with either interpretation.
Similarly, consider the following excerpt from an ambiguous reference
letter:

74
Much of the text of this section is drawn from R. Graham, Statutory Interpretation:
Theory and Practice (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2001) in which this “language based” theory
of construction is expanded by reference to Deconstruction, Critical Legal Studies, and several
linguistic structures (such as subtext and analogy) not dealt with in this paper.
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“You will be lucky if you can get Geoff to work for you.”
The ambiguity found in this sentence is particularly unfortunate, in
that it leads to two potential interpretations that are diametrically
opposed: the sentence could mean either (A) that Geoff is an excellent
worker and that the recipient of the letter would be lucky to have Geoff
join his or her workforce, or (B) that Geoff is lazy and the recipient of
the letter would be well advised to refrain from offering Geoff a job.
Obviously, the author of this sentence meant either (A) or (B), both of
which represent specific meanings. The sentence is ambiguous,
however, in that a reasonable reader could come away from reading this
sentence either believing that Geoff is lazy or that Geoff would be a
valued employee. The sentence itself gives no clues as to which of its
two potential meanings is appropriate, and an interpreter of the letter is
forced to search for additional information to assist in ascertaining the
letter’s meaning.
In order for a passage to qualify as “ambiguous”, the uncertainty of
meaning generated by the passage must not be capable of immediate
resolution by reference to context. For example, if the sentence “You
will be lucky if you can get Geoff to work for you” was found in a
glowing reference letter that spent three pages extolling Geoff’s
wondrous abilities and admirable work ethic, any apparent ambiguity in
the passage would disappear. In the context of an extremely positive
reference, the apparently ambiguous sentence would clearly amount to a
positive statement regarding Geoff’s employability. By the same token,
if the remainder of the hypothetical reference letter clearly indicated that
Geoff was a lazy or difficult employee, any apparent ambiguity in the
sentence would disappear. No word, phrase or passage that is clear
when read in context truly qualifies as “ambiguous”.
Unfortunately, not all problems of construction can be resolved by
appeals to context. Indeed, ambiguities of the sort referred to in the
preceding paragraphs (i.e., turns of phrase that support two or more
specific meanings that cannot be resolved by context) are all too
common in Canadian legislation, and frequently give rise to the need for
judicial interpretation. Consider the following examples:
Section 21(3), Canada Business Corporations Act:75 Shareholders
and creditors of a corporation, their personal representatives, the
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Director and, if the corporation is a distributing corporation, any
other person, on payment of a reasonable fee and on sending to a
corporation or its agent the affidavit referred to in subsection (7),
may on application require the corporation or its agent to furnish
within ten days from the receipt of the affidavit a list .... setting out
the names of the shareholders of the corporation ...
Who is required to pay a fee and supply an affidavit? Only the
“other person” referred to in the section, or the Director, Shareholders
and creditors as well?76
Section 10 of the Narcotic Control Act:77 A peace officer may, at
any time without a warrant, enter and search any place other than a
dwelling-house, and under the authority of a warrant issued under
section 12, enter and search any dwelling-house in which the peace
officer believes on reasonable grounds there is a narcotic by means
of or in respect of which an offence under this Act has been
committed.
Does the italicized language (importing the requirement of
reasonable grounds) apply only to searches of “dwelling-houses”, or
must the peace officer have reasonable grounds to search “any place
other than a dwelling-house” as well? In R. v. Jaagusta,78 the Provincial
Court of British Columbia held that, although the literal language of the
section makes it appear that the “reasonable grounds” requirement only
applies to dwelling-houses, a comma should be read into the provision
immediately preceding the italicized language, causing the requirement
of reasonable grounds to be shared by all places that may be the subject
of a search.
Section 100 (1.1) of the Criminal Code:79 The Court is not required
to make an order [preventing a criminal from owning firearms or
ammunition] where the Court is satisfied that the offender has
76
An informal poll of practising lawyers demonstrated significant division on this issue,
especially when it was pointed out that other sections of the CBCA make it clear that only persons
other than shareholders, creditors, and the director are required to pay a “reasonable fee” in order to
receive copies of certain documents.
77
R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1, s. 10 (emphasis added). Note that the Narcotic Control Act has now
been repealed and replaced by the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19.
78
[1974] B.C.J. No. 785, [1974] 3 W.W.R. 766 (Prov. Ct.).
79
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 100 (1.1), as amended (emphasis added). Note that this
provision has been significantly redrafted, due (in part) to the presence of this ambiguity. See the
current version of s. 113 (as amended by S.C. 1995, c. 39, ss. 139 and 190(e)).
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established that ... it is not desirable in the interests of the safety of
the offender or of any other person that the order be made.
Must the offender establish that he or she requires a firearm for his
or her own protection or for the protection of others, or must the
offender merely establish that he or she will not be a danger to himself,
herself or others if permitted to carry a gun? See R. v. Austin80 for a full
discussion of the ambiguities in this provision.
Even section 7 of the Charter contains at least two easily identifiable
instances of ambiguity. Section 7 of the Charter provides as follows:
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice.

Does the phrase “of the person” modify the word “security” only, or
does it modify the words “life” and “liberty” as well? While the
ambiguity is not obvious, it becomes evident when the phrase “life,
liberty and security of the person” is compared to the phrase “men,
women and children weighing over one hundred pounds”.81 Similarly, it
is unclear whether the text of section 7 refers to two distinct sets of
rights (namely, the right to life, liberty and security of the person as well
as an independent right not to be “deprived thereof”), or whether the
“not to be deprived” clause merely explains the nature of the right to
life, liberty and security of the person.
Each of the foregoing provisions is ambiguous in the sense that the
provision may give rise to two or more competing meanings, only one
of which accords with the intent of the statute’s drafter. A reasonable
reader of the provisions may come away with an incorrect impression,
simply because of imprecise language or faulty syntax that has been
used in the drafting of the enactment being considered. Wherever a
statute’s language gives rise to this form of equivocation or uncertainty,
the language of the statute may be referred to as “ambiguous”.
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3. Vagueness
“Vagueness” must be distinguished from ambiguity. According to Reed
Dickerson, vagueness and ambiguity are completely separate concepts
that have been blurred by careless lawyers and academics. In
Dickerson’s opinion:
It is unfortunate that many lawyers persist in using the word
“ambiguity” to include vagueness. To subsume both concepts under
the same name tends to imply that there is no difference between them
or that their differences are legally unimportant. Ambiguity is a
disease of language, whereas vagueness, which is sometimes a disease,
is often a positive benefit. With at least this significant difference
between the two concepts, it is helpful to refer to them by different
names.82

A statement may be referred to as “vague” where the breadth of the
language used in the statement gives rise to a range of meanings that
may or may not be consistent. For example, consider the phrase
“freedom of expression”. What exactly does this mean? Unlike the
ambiguous statements set out in the previous section, the phrase
“freedom of expression” does not lend itself to a finite number of clear
and specific constructions, but instead suggests a continuum of
meanings. It may include the freedom to do all things that convey
information, including peaceful or violent protest, harassing telephone
calls, macaroni art and interpretive dance (Interpretation A). On the
other hand, it may include only “valuable expression” that is
demonstrably worthy of constitutional protection, i.e., those forms of
expression that promote traditional democratic values (Interpretation B).
The statement is vague (rather than ambiguous) because the interpreter
is not confined to a choice between interpretations A and B. Instead, the
interpreter has the freedom to choose from an almost infinite number of
meanings that can be plotted along a continuum starting with A (an
exceedingly broad interpretation) and ranging to narrow interpretations
such as B (or even beyond). It is impossible to claim with any degree of
confidence that the utterer of the statement meant either A or B. Indeed,
the author of vague language might not have had a single, precise
intention when making the vague statement. The author may have had
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only a rough idea of the meaning being conveyed, or may have wanted
the details of the statement’s meaning to be ironed out through judicial
interpretation.
Viewed from another perspective, a vague word or phrase is
analogous to an empty basket into which any number of objects (in this
case, meanings) can be placed. The basket might be full, embracing all
of the possible meanings that are attributable to the words being
considered, or the basket may be relatively empty, embracing only some
small category or sub-set of the meanings that could be attributed to the
vague word or phrase. Consider, for example, the following legislative
passage:
178. Every one other than a peace officer engaged in the
discharge of his duty who has in his possession in a public place or
who deposits, throws or injects or causes to be deposited, thrown or
injected in, into or near any place, (a) an offensive volatile substance
that is likely to alarm, inconvenience, discommode or cause
discomfort to any person or to cause damage to property ... is guilty of
an offence punishable on summary conviction.

This passage (which is found in section 178 of Canada’s Criminal
Code) is replete with vague terminology. Consider the phrase “offensive
volatile substance”. As a vague legislative phrase, “offensive volatile
substance” can be looked upon as an empty basket capable of holding a
broad range of meanings — the “basket of meanings” might contain
relatively few meanings, embracing only those volatile substances that
pose a danger to human health.83 On the other hand, the basket might be
filled to the brim, including any chemically volatile substance with the
potential to offend (by producing a foul odour or an unpleasantly
coloured gas, for example). The section itself provides some interpretive
guidance: based on the closing language of subparagraph (a), the
substance in question must be one that is capable of causing alarm or
inconvenience. Using the “basket of meanings” approach, we know that
any “offensive volatile substance” that is incapable of causing
inconvenience or alarm should be excluded from the basket. This gives
rise to further questions of degree, such as the degree of inconvenience
or alarm that might be caused by the substance in question. Even with
83
It should be noted that “vague language” is only truly “vague” where the uncertainty of
meaning cannot be resolved by appeals to context. If, for example, “offensive volatile substance”
was defined or narrowed elsewhere in the legislation, the phrase could no longer be considered
vague.
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this interpretive guidance, we are uncertain as to whether the basket of
meanings associated with “offensive volatile substance” embraces
weapons-grade plutonium, pepper-spray or both. The task of the
judiciary when faced with vague terminology is to determine the extent
to which the basket of meanings must be filled, excluding those
potential meanings that do not “fit” with the legislation in question.
A quick perusal of any volume of the Revised Statutes of Canada
will reveal that vague legislative phrases are very common. Consider the
following examples:
Section 173 of the Criminal Code: Everyone who wilfully does an
indecent act ... in any place, with intent thereby to insult or offend
any person, is guilty of an offence punishable on summary
conviction.
What constitutes an indecent act? Indecency might include coarse
language or vulgar humour, or it may be confined to acts of extreme
indecency such as violent sex-acts performed in public. Similarly, what
is meant by the term “offend”? Does the intention to be ill-mannered
constitute an intent to offend, or must the “offender” do something that
the audience considers immoral or indecent?
Section 23(1) of the Food and Drugs Act:84 Subject to subsection
(1.1), an inspector may at any reasonable time enter any place where
the inspector believes on reasonable grounds any article to which
this Act or the regulations apply is manufactured, prepared,
preserved, packaged or stored ...
The term “reasonable” is used twice in this section, with no
guidance as to what might be a “reasonable” time to conduct a search or
a “reasonable” ground for suspecting that certain articles may be present
in the place to be searched.
Constitutional laws can be particularly vague. Consider the
following passages from the Charter:
Section 11(d): Any person charged with an offence has the right ...
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.

84

R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27.

212

Supreme Court Law Review

(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d)

What constitutes a “fair” hearing? Clearly, this fairness must include
something beyond an independent and impartial tribunal (which is dealt
with separately by the section), but no further guidance is provided.
Section 12: Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment.
Clearly, some forms of punishment are permitted under this section,
but no definition of cruelty or unusualness is provided.85
Section 7 of the Charter is extraordinarily vague, giving rise to a
broad range of interpretive problems. As we saw in the previous section,
section 7 of the Charter provides as follows:
Section 7: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person, and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice.
How broadly or narrowly should the courts define “liberty”? What
visions of justice qualify as “fundamental”? Does “security of the
person” include economic security, physical security, or something else?
As Mark Carter notes, some of the concepts embedded in section 7’s
language are “as enigmatic and amorphous as any in our jurisprudence”.86
Although some of the aforementioned legislative provisions may
contain ambiguous phrases, the problems noted above result from
language that is vague. Rather than giving rise to two or more specific,
contradictory, plausible meanings, the language of these provisions
leads to broad ranges of meaning, with little or no guidance as to the
meaning intended by each provision’s drafter. The extent to which one
must fill the “basket of meanings” associated with each passage is
unclear, leading to the need for judicial interpretation.
According to Reed Dickerson, the interpretive problems caused by
vagueness flow from the “open texture of concepts” that is inherent in
vague language. In Dickerson’s opinion:
Whereas “ambiguity” in its classical sense refers to equivocation,
“vagueness” refers to the degree to which, independently of
equivocation, language is uncertain in its respective application to a

85
Note that this provision also contains an instance of ambiguity. “Compound” problems
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number of particulars. Whereas the uncertainty of ambiguity is central,
with an “either-or” challenge, the uncertainty of vagueness lies in
marginal questions of degree.87

Thus, where language leaves the interpreter with a choice between
an easily ascertainable number of specific interpretive choices, the
problem can be attributed to ambiguity. Where the language being
interpreted leads to a broad continuum of meanings (giving rise to
“marginal questions of degree”), the problem can be attributed to
language that is vague.
4. Implications of Vagueness
The use of vague language in statutory provisions does not necessarily
imply a lack of skill on the part of the statute’s drafters. Indeed, by
employing vague language in an enactment, the legislature is sending
signals to the courts that should help the judiciary select the appropriate
means of resolving interpretive problems. By recognizing the existence
and implications of these “legislative signals”, courts can come to
understand a basic link between originalist and dynamic interpretation:
in many cases, the use of vague language may actually imply that the
legislature’s intent (which is the touchstone of originalist construction)
was to permit the use of dynamic interpretation and to acknowledge the
role of judicial “creativity” in the construction and application of
legislation.
One implication of vague statutory language is that the legislature
sought to avoid making political choices. Consider the difficult
decisions that were involved in the drafting of Canada’s Charter of
Rights. Which kinds of behaviour were worthy of constitutional
protection? How far could Parliament go in limiting or overriding basic
freedoms? What kinds of remedies are available for a breach of Charter
rights? Anyone who has watched the proceedings of Parliament can
appreciate the Herculean task involved in getting a group of politicians
to agree on these highly sensitive matters. How did the Charter’s
drafters finally reach a consensus? By drafting the Constitution in
extremely vague language and leaving politically hazardous details to
the courts. Rather than making all of the difficult, politically charged
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decisions, the framers agreed on basic principles and left the courts to
fill in the blanks. For example, the framers did not have to undertake the
difficult task of deciding whether or not particular forms of expression
were protected under section 2(b) of the Charter. Instead, the framers
simply protected “expression” and left the courts to make the difficult
policy choices. Similarly, rather than going to the immeasurable trouble
of enumerating the instances in which a Charter-based right may be
restricted in the face of competing social policies, the framers chose to
enact the exceedingly vague language of section 1, which subjects all
Charter rights to “reasonable limits”. Clearly, the difficult task of
expounding upon the limits that are “reasonable” has been left to the
judiciary, permitting the Charter’s framers to entrench a series of
governing principles rather than a comprehensive set of specific rules.
This practice is not confined to the drafting of constitutions. Where the
drafting of any statute involves difficult and sensitive political choices,
vagueness may be employed as an expedient drafting tool to delay the
choices by remitting them to future judicial construction.
The use of vagueness as a means of shifting political choices to the
judiciary does not amount to an abdication of legislative responsibility.
On the contrary, reliance on vague language is often the only means by
which the legislature can carry out its duty: in a representative
government, statutes are often born of cooperation between legislative
actors who are unable to agree on specific details. Even where a
majority government holds the reins of state, individual members of that
majority may passionately disagree on the contents of proposed
legislation. Despite their inability to agree on legislative minutiae,
legislators can often compromise through the use of general language
that is sufficiently broad to encompass the meanings intended by several
“disagreeable drafters” and sufficiently imprecise to avoid entrenching
any one drafter’s specific views. This commonly used technique of
legislative drafting has been referred to as the use of “more or less
intentional obscurities, perplexities, or imperfections, inserted or
permitted with a view to facilitate the passage of the Bill through
Parliament”.88 Through the use of vague language, the passage of bills
that might otherwise die on Parliament’s floor can be secured.
The power to garner sufficient votes to ensure the passage of a Bill
is not the only reason for using vague language. A second function of
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vague language is to demonstrate Parliament’s intention to grant
discretion to the courts and other officials charged with the task of
administering legislation. According to Francis Bennion:
By use of a word or phrase of wide meaning, legislative power is
delegated to the processors whose function is to work out the detailed
effect ... until the details are worked out, it will be doubtful what
exactly they are.89

Similarly, Reed Dickerson claims that “vagueness is often
desirable” in cases where “the legislative client believes it desirable to
leave the resolution of uncertainties to those who will administer and
enforce the statute”.90 In other words, contrary to the assumption of
originalists, statutory meaning does not precede interpretation in cases
involving vague statutory language. Only a rough idea of the
legislation’s meaning has been established, with the details left to be
worked out by courts or administrative officials.
Why would a legislature seek to delegate its powers to judicial or
administrative bodies? To put it bluntly, legislators may recognize their
own inability to predict the practical ramifications of legislation. The
legislator, who lacks the practical experience to understand the
appropriate application of an enactment, knows that the members of the
judiciary (or other body charged with administering and enforcing
legislation) often have the experience and the knowledge required to
apply vague statutory language in a manner that is appropriate.
Consider, for example, section 11 of the Narcotic Control Act (“NCA”)
(now repealed),91 which permitted the police to engage in warrantless
searches based on “reasonable grounds”. The phrase “reasonable
grounds” was not defined in the NCA. Nowhere in the statute was the
judiciary given guidance as to what might constitute “reasonable
grounds” for the purposes of the Act. Similarly, section 63 of the
Criminal Code prohibits “tumultuous disturbances” of the peace.
“Disturbing the peace” is not defined. Nor does the Code describe how
one could disturb the peace in a “tumultuous” manner. In instances such
as these, the drafter has used an extremely broad term for the purpose of
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delegating the task of filling in the “legislative blanks” to the judiciary.
Judges are able to determine what are “reasonable grounds” for searches
because of long exposure to fact situations involving police behaviour.
Judges know what “disturbs the peace tumultuously” because of their
great experience adjudicating offences against the public order. The
legislator, by contrast, has neither the expertise nor the inclination to
define these vague terms with specificity. Through the use of the vague
language found in these statutes, the legislature acknowledges the
judiciary’s expertise and grants courts the discretion to apply and
interpret the law as they see fit.92
Finally, the use of vague language may demonstrate the drafters’
intent to permit the language of an enactment to take on a life of its own.
One unfortunate aspect of a strictly originalist approach to interpretation
is the refusal to acknowledge that the drafters may have wanted the
courts to use dynamic interpretation when construing certain provisions.
According to Peter Hogg, “what originalism ignores is the possibility
that the framers were content to leave the detailed application ... to the
courts of the future, and were content that the process of adjudication
would apply the text in ways unanticipated at the time of drafting”.93 In
other words, the drafters may actually be aware of the evolutive nature
of statutory language, and hope that the courts employ a progressive or
dynamic approach to interpreting the language used in their enactments.
The manner in which the legislative drafters signal their intent to leave
the stewardship of language to the courts is through the use of vague
language, which lends itself to evolution through a dynamic interpretive
process.
If the use of vague language implies a delegation of power from the
drafters to the courts or an expression of the desire to permit language to
evolve, what approach should interpreters take when confronted with
vague legislative terms? In my view, the construction of vague language
necessarily requires the use of dynamic interpretation. Where the
legislature sees fit to express its intention in vague terms, the courts
should be free to assume either that (1) the lawgiver wished to delegate
the development and detailed application of the statute to the judiciary
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(either because of judicial expertise or for reasons relating to political
expedience), or (2) the legislature wished to allow the statute to evolve
along with changes in society’s views or public policy. Whichever
reason the lawgiver had for drafting a vague provision, the court is
clearly justified in using dynamic interpretation to resolve interpretive
problems. Indeed, adopting a strictly originalist approach in these
situations is almost impossible. If the drafter had no specific intention
(as is often the case where vague language is concerned), then the
foundation of originalist construction has disappeared, leaving the court
with no choice but to adopt a dynamic construction. As noted above,
interpreters cannot help but be influenced by the social and factual
context that surrounds an interpretive problem. Where the legislature,
through the use of vague terminology, has refrained from providing the
court with sufficient guidance to determine the statute’s meaning, the
court should be free to rely openly on this social and factual context in
ascribing meaning to the enactment’s language. More importantly, the
court should be explicit in its reliance on a dynamic form of
construction, openly admitting that its decision is based on current
social policy rather than on presumed, specific legislative intent. This
approach is more honest than originalist construction in that it openly
recognizes the role of application in statutory construction: when
interpreting vague statutory provisions, the interpreter will inevitably be
influenced by the external factual context. More importantly, the use of
dynamic interpretation in the construction of vague language permits the
court to respond to current needs while still respecting the framer’s
intention: if the lawgiver had no specific or detailed intention with
respect to a statute’s meaning, or chose to enact vague language to avoid
a political choice, the judiciary is clearly within its rights to “create a
meaning” that is consistent with contemporary ideals. By accepting the
delegation of power that is implied by vague language, the courts do not
intrude on the legislature’s function, but rather respect the author’s
intention to have the courts make detailed decisions that the drafters
lacked the ability (or the inclination) to make.
As we noted in section II, 3. above, courts typically voice reluctance
to depart from legislative intention in all cases save those involving
constitutional statutes or “fundamental laws” (such as human rights
enactments). While human rights enactments and constitutional laws
might warrant the invocation of dynamic construction, courts contend
that ordinary enactments (such as criminal laws, taxing acts and
immigration statutes) must be interpreted through reliance on originalist
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construction. Section IV, 2. of this essay demonstrated that, in practice,
courts do not truly abide by this bifurcated approach to interpretive
theory. On the contrary, the courts appear to choose their interpretive
theories based on unclear (or unarticulated) reasons, which may have
little or nothing to do with the nature of the document being considered.
Recall the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Butler 94
(discussed in section IV, 3., above). In that case, the Court was asked to
interpret section 163 of the Criminal Code, which prohibited the
distribution of any “obscene” material. As we saw in section IV, 3., the
Court in Butler construed the word “obscene” in a distinctly dynamic
fashion, eschewing reliance on traditional notions of legislative intent.
What was it that led the Court in Butler to adopt a dynamic approach,
rather than adhering to originalist construction? The legislation at issue
in Butler was neither part of the constitution nor a “quasi-constitutional”
enactment, yet (as we have seen) the courts have consistently stated that
the progressive or dynamic mode of construction used in Butler should
be restricted to cases involving these progressive and “evolutive”
enactments. In my view, the use of dynamic interpretation in cases such
as Butler is not driven by the nature of the document being interpreted,
but by the nature of the language giving rise to interpretive problems.
Like much of the language found in constitutional documents or in
the provisions of human rights legislation, the term “obscene” (which
gave rise to the interpretive problem in Butler) is not ambiguous in the
sense that it gives rise to two or more distinct interpretive choices. On
the contrary, the word “obscene” is extremely vague in that an almost
infinite range of interpretive choices are available. Some might consider
the term “obscene” to encompass only the depiction of explicit sexual
contact. Some might extend the term to include anything that could
make a pastor blush. Between these two extremes are countless
variations of meaning, each of which could supply a supportable
definition of “obscene”. Because the legislature saw fit to enact section
163 through the use of vague terminology, the Court in Butler was free
to make up for this lack of precision through the use of a dynamic form
of construction.
The language at issue in Butler parallels the language at issue in
B.C. Motor Vehicle, Morgentaler, Gosselin, Sears and BCGSEU
(discussed above). In those cases, the Court was asked to interpret the
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terms “fundamental justice”, “liberty”, “security of the person”,
“discriminate” and “discrimination”. The terms in question are not
ambiguous in the sense that they give rise to two or more specific and
ascertainable meanings. On the contrary, the relevant terms are vague.
Consider, for example, the term “liberty”: perhaps it includes nothing
beyond freedom from physical restraint. Perhaps it includes privacy
interests, as it does in the context of the United States’ Constitution.
Perhaps it includes freedom of contract, or the liberty to act however
one chooses (subject only to limits prescribed in accordance with
section 1). An interpreter of section 7 is not forced to choose between
these various options, but may fill the “basket of meanings” associated
with the term “liberty” as little or as much as the interpreter desires.
Like all vague terms, the term “liberty” gives rise to marginal questions
of degree, rather than to the “either/or” challenge that is inherent in
ambiguous legislation. The Court’s decisions involving section 7 of the
Charter, like the decisions in Sears, BCGSEU and Butler, make it clear
that where interpretive problems arise from the use of language of this
nature, the use of dynamic interpretation provides a principled means of
creating specific statutory meanings.
5. Implications of Ambiguity
Unlike vagueness, which serves a number of purposes in legislative
provisions, ambiguity (as described in section V, 2., above) can generally
be traced to drafting errors. These drafting problems can be grouped into
two specific categories, namely (1) clumsy syntax, or (2) the use of
homonyms or terms with multiple meanings. Where either of these
common language errors occurs in the creation of legislation, the result
is an ambiguous statute that will give rise to the need for judicial
interpretation.
The first source of ambiguity was referred to by William Empson as
the divergence of language “from the colloquial order of statement” in
ways that imply “several colloquial orders from which the statement has
diverged”.95 Although Empson’s comments were made in the context of
poetic interpretation, they are equally applicable in the context of
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legislation. For an example of this type of ambiguity, consider the
following legislative provision:
A ten per cent reduction in federal tax shall be available to all
charitable corporations and institutions performing educational
functions.

The phrase “charitable corporations and institutions performing
educational functions” departs from the “colloquial order of statement”
by distributing multiple adjectives across a collection of nouns.
Consider the following questions: must charitable corporations perform
educational functions in order to qualify for the reduction in federal tax?
Must institutions performing educational functions also be charitable in
order to qualify for the benefit of the statute? Depending upon the
answers that any particular reader gives to these questions, various
specific and contradictory meanings of the statute will be generated. In
other words, the statute is ambiguous. The ambiguity arises due to
grammatical irregularities in the statute, or the departure of the statute’s
language from accepted patterns of speech. This particular source of
ambiguity is common in legislation, and generally arises due to the
drafter’s desire to use as few words as possible when attempting to
describe a complex subject.
The second most common source of legislative ambiguity is the
unfortunate use of homonyms that cannot be resolved by context. For
example, consider the following excerpt from an actual piece of
legislation:
... any constable shall take into custody, without warrant, and
forthwith convey before a justice, any person who within his view
commits [a public order offence].96

Consider the possible meanings of the word “view” in this
provision. Does it mean “opinion”, in which case the officer may arrest
any person who “within the officer’s opinion” is committing an offence,
or does the word “view” mean “field of vision”, in which case an officer
may arrest only persons who the officer actually sees breaking the law?
The section provides no clues as to which of the two meanings is
appropriate. Indeed, even context cannot resolve the ambiguity with any
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degree of certainty: in Wills v. Bowley 97 England’s highest Court was
sharply divided over the proper meaning of “view” in this provision.98
If ambiguity can be traced to problems of grammar or the
thoughtless use of terms with multiple meanings, what does ambiguous
language imply when found in legislation? Unlike vagueness, which can
be the government’s way of creating judicial discretion or avoiding
political choice, “ambiguity” generally implies nothing more than a
fallible drafter. While statutes are drafted in vague terms in order to
accomplish various legislative objectives, “beyond human fallibility,
there is no reason why a legal instrument need be ambiguous”.99
Ambiguity does not imply the form of “delegation of power” that is
inherent in the use of vague provisions. Consider the following samples
of ambiguous legislation:
(1) A will shall be void “if the will is duly executed without the
[testator’s] attestation”.100
(2) The ownership of firearms is restricted to “the son and heir
apparent of an esquire, or other person of higher degree”.101
Clearly, the authors of each of these statements must have meant to
say something specific. The author of statement (1) either meant (a) that
the testator’s signature must accompany the witness’ signature
(regardless of who signs first), or (b) that the testator must sign the will
before it is executed by witnesses. Similarly, statement (2) is highly
ambiguous in that it supports at least three meanings: it could permit the
ownership of firearms by (a) all persons of higher degree than esquires;
(b) all persons of higher degree than the sons and heirs apparent of
esquires; or (c) the sons and heirs apparent of all persons of higher
degree than esquires. The language of the statement provides little or no
evidence of which of the three meanings should be preferred.
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Statements (1) and (2) are not vague: neither statement suffers from
the use of general language that supports a broad continuum of
meanings. Instead, each of the statements supports two or more specific
and contradictory meanings which give rise to the need for judicial
interpretation. In other words, the statements are ambiguous. The
interpretive problems inherent in statements (1) and (2) arose from the
authors’ inability to convey the intended meaning with precision. The
implications that arise where statutes are drafted in vague terms are not
present in these cases. There was no failure of the author to form a
specific intention. There was no attempt to delegate power to the
judiciary. There was no bid by the author to promote the evolution of a
statutory provision. All that happened was an unfortunate drafting error,
causing the statute’s failure to spell out the drafter’s intention. In such
cases, there is no need or justification for dynamic interpretation. The
interpreter’s only task is archaeological in nature, requiring the judge to
sift through the statute’s language in search of clues as to the drafter’s
intended meaning. Because of the nature of ambiguity (described in
section V, 2., above), we can be certain that an “original intention” does
exist. The language of an ambiguous enactment supports only a small
number of meanings, only one of which can be the meaning that the
legislative drafter meant to convey. Because this meaning resides within
the enactment from the time of its creation, the job of the interpreter is
to discover this meaning and apply it to the facts before the court. In
other words, ambiguity must be resolved through originalist
construction. All elements of originalist construction, including rules of
grammatical construction, contextual interpretation, basic interpretive
presumptions (including the mischief rule, the golden rule and countless
maxims of construction) and evidence of historical intent are uniquely
suited to resolving this form of linguistic conundrum. Through the
application of these well-accepted rules of interpretation, the judiciary is
able to ferret out the provision’s intended meaning and ensure that the
legislator’s authority as “lawgiver” is respected. The weaknesses of
originalist construction are of minimal importance in such cases.
Ambiguity (by its very definition) confines the judge’s choice to a small
number of discrete interpretive options. In cases involving ambiguity,
the originalist has no need to carry out an endless, fruitless search for a
malleable or hard-to-define intention: the meaning that the drafter hoped
to convey will be found within one of a few possible constructions of
the ambiguous passage. All that the originalist interpreter must do in
such cases is apply the tools of originalism to select the one construction
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(from a small number of choices) that exemplifies the statute’s “true
meaning”.
It should be noted that originalist construction is the appropriate
method of resolving ambiguities, even in those rare instances where the
relevant ambiguity is found in a “fundamental statute” such as the
Charter. Consider, for example, section 7 of the Charter, which provides
that everyone has the right to “life, liberty and security of the person”.
As we saw in section V, 2., above, the phrase “of the person” can be
read as (a) modifying only the word “security”, or (b) modifying each of
the words “life, liberty and security”. If the phrase “of the person”
modifies the word “liberty”, for example, no entities other than
“persons” are entitled to the liberty rights enshrined in section 7. If the
phrase “of the person” does not modify the word liberty, by contrast, the
right to liberty may extend to “non-person” entities (such as partnerships
or social clubs) as well. From a grammatical perspective, the provision
can be read either way. This is a problem of ambiguity because it gives
rise to an “either / or” challenge: The section either protects “liberty of
the person” (Interpretation A), or it protects “liberty” with no limitation
dependent upon the “personhood” (or lack thereof) of the entity being
considered (Interpretation B). The author meant either A or B, and left
no evidence of an intention to delegate the choice of A or B to future
interpreters. Because of the implications of ambiguous language
(identified above), this ambiguity should be resolved through originalist
construction, respecting the intention of the legislative author. This is so
despite the fact that the ambiguity is located in a “fundamental”
enactment. Whether an ambiguity is found in an ordinary enactment, in
a provision of the Charter, in the Criminal Code or in an Act creating
human rights, the ambiguity should be resolved by originalist
construction. By the same token, vague language should be interpreted
through dynamic interpretation, regardless of the nature of the Act in
which it is found.
As noted above, ambiguous statutory language does not carry the
same implications as a vague term found in legislation. In cases of
ambiguity, the legislative drafter clearly had a specific intent: he or she
simply committed a drafting error that failed to make this intention
clear. Because the drafter of ambiguous language clearly had a specific
intention, the statute contains a “true meaning” that precedes
interpretation. Obviously, the legislature has turned its collective mind
to a particular problem and proposed a specific solution, despite the
drafter’s inability to express the proposed solution with precision. As
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the elected branch of government has exercised its constitutional
mandate and expressed its will in the form of legislation, it is the task of
the judiciary to apply the law in accordance with the legislator’s
expectations. Any departure from originalist construction in these cases
runs the risk of clothing the courts with unwarranted legislative power.
A failure to give effect to an originalist construction in such cases would
also run afoul of Canada’s various Interpretation Acts, which command
the courts to adopt interpretations that are based on the legislature’s
historical objectives.102 As a result, where interpretive problems result
from ambiguity (rather than vagueness), an originalist approach to
interpretation should be adopted.
6. Summary
A court’s choice between originalism and dynamism should not be
governed by the court’s assessment of whether or not a particular law is
part of the Constitution, “fundamental”, “quasi-constitutional”, or “more
than ordinary” in nature. Instead, the Court’s selection of interpretive
theory should be based on the nature of the linguistic problem giving
rise to the need for judicial interpretation. Where the linguistic problem
is an instance of vagueness, the Court should use dynamic
interpretation: through the use of vague language, the lawgiver has (a)
demonstrated a desire to allow language to evolve, (b) sought to avoid a
political choice, delegating this choice to the courts or to administrative
officials, or (c) simply failed to arrive at a specific intention. Whether
the reason for the use of vague language is reason (a), (b) or (c), there is
no specific intention to be found: the basis of originalist construction is
absent, and the Court is clothed with authority to invoke dynamic
construction. In the case of ambiguous language, by contrast, the
legislature has made a drafting error, and the only task of the court is to
eliminate the mistake. In cases such as this, an originalist approach
respects the separation of powers between the judiciary and the
legislative assembly: there is a “true intention” to be found, and the job
of the court is to correct the author’s drafting error, revealing the

102
This particular criticism applies only where non-constitutional laws are concerned:
Canada’s various Interpretation Acts do not govern the interpretation of the Constitution.
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original intention that was obscured by nothing more than an
unintentional slip of the legislator’s pen.103

VI. CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate, perhaps, that Anglo-Canadian jurists first took note of
dynamic construction when interpreting the text of constitutions. When
interpreting an inspirational, nation-building document such as Canada’s
Constitution, it is easy to be distracted by the importance of the
document being construed. The interpretation of section 7 is a
particularly awe-inspiring enterprise. As the Court noted in Blencoe, the
text of section 7 expresses some of the basic values upon which Canada
is built. When attempting to discern the meaning of legislation
governing such values, it is easy to convince yourself that you are
engaged in a special interpretive enterprise that shares very little in
common with more “mundane” exercises of statutory construction. This
has, perhaps, contributed to the unhappy perception that dynamic
construction should be reserved for the interpretation of “fundamental
statutes”. As we have seen throughout this paper, our courts have
repeatedly (and mistakenly) claimed that only fundamental statutes
should be construed through the invocation of dynamic interpretation,
while merely “ordinary laws” are governed by legislative intent. As we
have seen, this “bifurcated” approach to theory selection makes no
sense. More importantly, it fails to correspond with the actual practices
of our courts.
Whether a law is considered a “fundamental law” or simply an
“ordinary” enactment, the interpretation of the relevant law can be
pursued by reference to a single, unified theory of statutory
construction. Under this proposed theory, a court faced with a problem
of construction must undertake a careful reading of the statute. The
purpose of this reading is to reveal the nature of the linguistic problem
plaguing the law. Where the problem is a result of vague language, the

103
It seems that Canada’s federal courts are now beginning to embrace this method of
“theory selection”, and recognizing the important distinctions between vagueness and ambiguity.
For excellent examples of decisions in which these distinctions are recognized, see the decision of
Evans J. (as he then was) in Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1999]
F.C.J. No. 1531, [2000] 1 F.C. 146, as well as the decision of Evans J.A. (yes, the same Justice
Evans, now elevated to the Federal Court of Appeal) in De Guzman v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 2119 (C.A.) (released December 20, 2005).
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court should resolve the problem through dynamic interpretation. Where
the source of the problem is ambiguous language, by contrast, the court
should rely on originalist construction and resolve the problem by
reference to the legislator’s intent. The unanswerable question of
whether or not a particular law is “fundamental” does not arise: whether
interpreting section 7 of the Charter or a dreary set of parking
regulations, courts should focus on the textual clues found in legislation,
selecting whichever interpretive theory corresponds to textual clues that
were left behind by the drafter of the relevant statute. By responding to
the author’s textual clues, the court ensures that the interpretive theory it
adopts, whether originalist or dynamic, respects the intentions and
objectives of the legislative author.

